



Optimizing the State Intelligence Oversight System: Ensuring Accountability in Indonesia's Democratic State

Yudha Fernando^{1*}, Arthur Josias Simon Runturambi²

^{1,2}Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia

yudha.fernando01@ui.ac.id^{1*}, a.josias@ui.ac.id²

*Corresponding Author

Article Info

Article history:

Received: March 15, 2025

Revised: April 15, 2026

Accepted: April 29, 2026

Keywords:

Accountability,
Democratic Oversight,
Intelligence Oversight,
Multi-layered Oversight,
National Security Intelligence

Abstract

The objective of this study is to formulate a good and accountable intelligence governance. At the same time, this is fundamental to a democratic state. Implementing this principle is crucial to preventing abuse of power and ensuring that intelligence activities are conducted responsibly. The object and purpose of this study are to identify the current position of the national security intelligence oversight system in Indonesia and provide suggestions for optimizing intelligence oversight. This study aims to balance national security needs with civil liberties and privacy, and facilitate reporting of suspicious activity. This study employed a descriptive, qualitative approach. Primary and secondary data were obtained through a literature review of intelligence oversight and related regulations, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. These data were then validated through method and source triangulation techniques, peer debriefing, and member checking before being analyzed using Miles and Huberman's qualitative analysis method. The theory used in this study is the Intelligence Oversight Theory, a legal and procedural framework that ensures all intelligence activities comply with laws, executive orders, and human rights. The results of the study show that, to optimize the layered intelligence oversight system, the involvement of civil society entities and the establishment of a new independent oversight entity are needed. Meanwhile, to optimize the effectiveness of intelligence supervision, it is necessary to add three indicators: timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy.

DOI:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v12i1.19881>

2549-9459/Published by Indonesia Defense University. This is an open-access article under the CC BY-NC license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>)

INTRODUCTION

State Intelligence is defined comprehensively through three main dimensions: knowledge, organization, and activity (Undang-Undang Intelijen Negara., 2011). Apart from that, state intelligence is also defined as the function of maintaining national security and interests (Astarini & Rofii, 2021). It also stated that intelligence is an important instrument for the implementation of state power (Mayangsari, 2024), in which the concepts of power, influence, and politics become the focus of multidimensional analysis across various contexts, including the political context. (Ansori et al., 2024). Political acts also negotiate scale by breaking laws that individuals deem unjust or by wearing clothes that make a political statement (Flint, 2022), thereby posing a threat to state power.

The background to this study is the suboptimal nature of the existing intelligence oversight system. Intelligence oversight in Indonesia is not yet fully optimal and lacks preventive measures, as oversight is currently only active when irregularities occur. Given this issue, there is an urgent need to optimize the intelligence oversight model to maintain national security. The current Multi-Layered Supervisory System and Intelligence Oversight Effectiveness Indicators have not been able to balance national security needs with civil liberties and privacy, nor to facilitate the reporting of suspicious activity. This phenomenon has the potential to create opportunities for state intelligence officials to abuse their power and carry out intelligence activities in an unaccountable and irresponsible manner. The gap in previous studies lies specifically in this study's ability to address effective intelligence oversight through a multi-layered approach that involves internal and external mechanisms. This paper emphasizes the importance of strong intelligence oversight to maintaining a balance among security, human rights, and democracy through an intelligence oversight layer involving civil society or independent groups that provide criticism and suggestions regarding alleged intelligence irregularities.

This research focuses on intelligence as an organization, with intelligence governance as its object of study. It aims to balance national security needs with civil liberties, privacy, and the facilitation of reporting suspicious activity. The objective of this study is to formulate a good and accountable intelligence governance. At the same time, this is fundamental to a democratic state. Meanwhile, this study aims to prevent abuse of power and ensure that intelligence activities are carried out in an accountable and responsible manner. This study also emphasizes the importance of the determinants of punctuality, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy in intelligence oversight. This ensures that intelligence organizations' performance, financial governance, and threat assessments are accountable.

This qualitative descriptive study began with the collection of primary and secondary data obtained through a literature review on intelligence oversight and related regulations. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions followed this. The data were then validated through method and source triangulation, peer debriefing, and member checking before being analyzed using Miles and Huberman's qualitative analysis method. The theory used in this study is the Intelligence Oversight theory.

Intelligence entities must provide accurate, truthful, precise, and timely intelligence so that users have complete information about an issue and sufficient time before making a policy decision (Fernando, 2019b). It is explained that the principle of confidentiality remains a key feature of intelligence, maintaining its operational effectiveness. However, intelligence oversight is needed so that intelligence activities remain measurable without sacrificing their confidentiality (Fernando, 2025). In addition, intelligence is known to have certain characteristics that set it apart (Arbani, 2023). This oversight ensures public accountability within certain limits, although intelligence in the public sector cannot be completely transparent like other public elements. To prevent the leaking of state intelligence secrets, internal oversight is required for each intelligence agency, carried out by its respective leaders (Putri, 2024).

The function of intelligence is to provide early warning of threats or possible problems that may occur (Runturambi & Kusdiarto, 2023) whereas intelligence as an activity refers to covert activity, whether in the form of clandestine activities or covert action. The output of intelligence activities is called Positive Clandestine Intelligence, and it can take the form of espionage, propaganda, social conflict (riots), or terror (Fernando, 2019a). Therefore, within the framework of democracy, oversight must be grounded in the core democratic principles, including the protection of civil rights, respect for human rights, and the enforcement of law and democratic norms. Democratic control over intelligence institutions is a challenge everywhere (Bruneau & Dombroski, 2021). In Indonesia, the State Intelligence Law Number 17 of 2011 regulates the role, duties, and limitations of the state intelligence agency. The aim is to provide legal certainty and ensure that intelligence functions remain optimal in maintaining national security without violating democratic principles.

The role of intelligence agencies is very necessary (Sirait & Abdillah, 2025), considering that the early warning system function inherent in intelligence is at the forefront of prevention efforts (Harahap et al., 2021). However, transparency in democratic government institutions is important to maintain public legitimacy (Hulnick, 1999). The Intelligence Law is here to guarantee collective security while respecting Human Rights (HAM). Although confidential, the Intelligence Law serves as a guide to limiting intelligence actions and to clearly articulating the public's right to know the authority of intelligence, thereby maintaining democratic principles. Accountable oversight of intelligence is key to maintaining public legitimacy (Born & Leight, 2005). In Indonesia, this function is regulated in the Intelligence Law, which stipulates internal and external oversight. With proper oversight, intelligence can contribute to security and good governance.

METHODS

This study employs a descriptive, qualitative design to understand and explain the characteristics of the variables in the situation being studied (Sekaran & Bougie, 2020). The process and meaning are more emphasized in descriptive research types, with a theoretical basis that is used as a guide, so that the research focus is in accordance with the facts in the field (Ramdhan, 2021). The qualitative descriptive method is a more

descriptive research method, focusing on understanding, so that understanding can be deepened (Imanina, 2025). In this research, a descriptive method was chosen to identify strategic solutions to optimize intelligence oversight and prevent misunderstandings in intelligence activities. This is because intelligence knowledge requires specific and limited training and education.

This research uses primary and secondary data sources, including literature reviews, Focus Group Discussions, and in-depth interviews with expert sources in the field of intelligence governance. Literature review is a crucial step. After a researcher has established a research topic, the next step is to conduct a study related to the theory and research topic. Finding data for a topic is also very easy; researchers need to look for references or literature such as books, journals, magazines, and previous research results. The theories, materials, and data collected from the literature must be interconnected (Ilhami et al., 2024). Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are a research method for obtaining findings that can be used and analyzed as data. Therefore, the process and variables collected as data findings are of primary importance. FGDs are not conducted for the purpose of generating problem-solving or reaching an immediate consensus (Sugarda, 2020). Meanwhile, an interview is defined as communication between two or more parties that can be done face to face, where one party acts as the interviewer and the other party acts as the interviewee, with a specific goal (Fadhallah, 2025). The author used more than 10 speakers for in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). The criteria were that the informants had attended intelligence training, had more than 15 years of intelligence experience, or had formal intelligence education. The interviews and FGDs took place in Central Jakarta, South Jakarta, Depok, Sentul, and Bogor.

Meanwhile, the author's theory is intelligence oversight and intelligence as an organization. Selection of data sources and theories in accordance with the unique and limited character of intelligence science. From the data collection stage through the literature review, six entities were identified as actors in intelligence oversight within a multi-layered supervision system. Meanwhile, to assess the effectiveness of intelligence supervision, ten indicators were identified.

From the in-depth interviews and FGDs with expert sources in the field of intelligence governance, it is evident that the layered intelligence oversight currently in place in Indonesia still has several shortcomings. The data were then validated through triangulation, peer debriefing, and member checking. The data is then analyzed using the Miles and Huberman qualitative analysis method. The analysis stages consist of data reduction, data display, and conclusion. Their approach emphasizes an iterative process in which data is continuously condensed, organized, and visualized. In this study, it was concluded that to optimize the effectiveness of intelligence oversight in Indonesia, the involvement of civil society entities and the establishment of a new independent supervisory body are needed. In addition, there is an urgency to add intelligence supervision indicators, such as timeliness (punctuality), cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy, to the performance of national security intelligence in Indonesia.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Multi-Layered Oversight

The multi-layered oversight model used in many democratic countries, as proposed by Born & Leight, places intelligence within a governance system that involves multiple layers of oversight to keep intelligence functions in line with democratic principles (Born & Leight, 2005). Intelligence oversight is carried out through several complementary layers (Yanuarti, 2017), and the importance of strong oversight is to maintain a balance among security, human rights, and democracy (Gill, 2009). This multi-layered oversight reduces the risk of abuse of power and human rights violations, and ensures accountability and transparency in intelligence operations. Intelligence oversight is a crucial feature of intelligence activities in democratic countries (Haripin, 2022). Oversight commissions in both the executive and legislative branches monitor the use of intelligence funds and operations to ensure they do not violate citizens' social, political, and economic rights. Meanwhile, wise and transparent handling of conflicts of interest is key to maintaining the integrity and credibility of intelligence agencies in supporting Indonesia's national security. (Dzikrullah & Julianto, 2024). Intelligence must operate in accordance with legal norms and professional ethics. Good oversight can navigate between secrecy and public demands, striking the right balance between national security and civil liberties (Gill, 2003).

Based on the literature, effective intelligence oversight requires a multi-layered approach that involves both internal and external mechanisms. Internal oversight is carried out by institutions or individuals within the intelligence organization, such as internal evaluations and audits. Meanwhile, external oversight involves independent entities such as parliamentary commissions or civil society groups that monitor and supervise intelligence activities from outside.

Based on the results of interviews with the Experts staff of Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives, it is known that in Indonesia, intelligence oversight is regulated by the State Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2011 and DPR Regulation No. 2 of 2014, which explains the mechanism of internal oversight by intelligence leaders and external oversight by a special commission in the DPR.

Meanwhile, the results of an in-depth interview with the Coordinator of the Political Working Group-Lentera Research Institute revealed that Legislative oversight also plays an important role in the legitimacy and oversight of intelligence operations. Legislative entities have the authority to approve budgets, investigate, and request regular reports from intelligence agencies, ensuring that intelligence operations are conducted in accordance with the law and democratic principles. This assures the public that intelligence functions lawfully and transparently. Intelligence oversight aims to ensure transparency and prevent potential abuse of power or human rights violations.

Based on the intelligence oversight theory proposed by Born & Leight, which places intelligence within a governance system involving several layers of oversight (Born & Leight, 2005), and the intelligence oversight theory proposed by Yanuarti, where intelligence oversight is conducted through several complementary layers (Yanuarti, 2017), The following are the results of the author's data collection.

Born & Leight's multilayered oversight model states that the first layer is internal oversight, in which intelligence agency leaders supervise their subordinates to ensure tasks are carried out in accordance with SOPs and codes of ethics. This oversight also involves regular reporting from intelligence officers to the leadership for monitoring and evaluation (Born & Leight, 2005).

The results of the literature reviews were then followed up with interviews with expert staff at Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), as part of triangulation validation. Expert staff stated that internal oversight in Indonesia is regulated under Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Intelligence Law, which requires the leadership of each entity to conduct internal oversight.

The second layer, stated by Born & Leight, is executive oversight, namely the President and his staff. Executive oversight must be under the democratic control of elected politicians, such as the President, to ensure that intelligence institutions work in accordance with established policies. Clear political direction from the President, as the end user, is very important to ensure that intelligence produces products that support the success of government programs (Born & Leight, 2005). In this regard, Expert staff at Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) stated that the government has the authority to ensure that intelligence activities comply with applicable laws and policies. Intelligence supports government policy, especially by collecting data and analyzing threats to national security, both within and outside the country. Meanwhile, the Coordinator of the Political Working Group-Lentera Research Institute stated that Executive oversight is important to ensure that intelligence aligns with the government's national security priorities. This ensures that intelligence aligns with national security interests and is relevant to the government's policies.

The third layer involves legislative institutions, such as the DPR, which play an important role in maintaining the principle of "Checks and Balances" (Born & Leight, 2005). The importance of the legislative function to provide accountability to the executive regarding intelligence operations, as well as creating a legal basis for oversight, including the involvement of civil society (Robertson, 1998). Responding to Born & Leight and Robertson's statement, LESPERSSI researchers stated this legislative function ensures that intelligence activities are carried out in accordance with the law and as a liaison between the government and the public, so that public needs are reflected in intelligence supervision. In addition, parliament is also tasked with establishing a legal framework for intelligence and overseeing the executive to ensure that intelligence activities serve the national interest, not certain political interests. Legislatures not only provide legitimacy to intelligence activities but also ensure democratic accountability. By conducting effective oversight, parliaments can ensure that intelligence activities are in line with national security and transparent to the public.

The final layer, stated by Born & Leight, is oversight by civil society or independent groups, which provide criticism and suggestions regarding alleged intelligence irregularities. LESPERSSI researchers stated they convey these aspirations through the legislature, so that the public can participate in intelligence oversight. Independent

oversight in intelligence ensures that agencies operate within legal boundaries, uphold human rights, and maintain public trust, often through specialized, non-partisan bodies.

The results of the literature study and interviews were then followed up with FGD as a form of triangulation validation and member checking. The criteria for FGD interviewees included having attended intelligence training, having more than 15 years of intelligence experience, or having formal intelligence education. The FGD (Focus Group Discussion) was held in Pasar Minggu, South Jakarta, in January 2025. The research conducted interviews and FGDs with the Executive Director of Makara Strategic Insight (MSI) Research, a senior researcher at Vox Point, the Coordinator of the Central Intelligence Committee (Kominpus) Analysts, a senior researcher at the BIN Research Center, and a senior researcher at LPKN.

Table 1. First FGD Result

Themes\ Participants	Born & Leight 1st Layer	Born & Leight 2nd Layer	Born & Leight 3rd Layer	Born & Leight 4th Layer
MSI Research	Internal Oversight is available	President, Supreme Audit Agency, Indonesian National Human Rights Commission	Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives	Urgent to expand intelligence oversight
Vox Point	Internal Oversight is available	President, Supreme Audit Agency	Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives	Urgent to expand intelligence oversight
Kominpus	Internal Oversight is available	President, Supreme Audit Agency, Judiciary	Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives and the Intelligence Oversight Team.	Agree to expand intelligence oversight
BIN Research Center	Internal Oversight is available	President, Supreme Audit Agency, Corruption Eradication Committee, Judiciary	Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives and the Intelligence Oversight Team.	Agree to expand intelligence oversight
LPKN	Internal Oversight is available	President, Supreme Audit Agency, Judiciary	Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives	Agree to expand intelligence oversight

Source: Processed by the Authors Based on First FGD Result, 2026

Based on the results of focus group discussions with experts in national security intelligence governance, it was concluded that the intelligence oversight model in Indonesia (in accordance with Law No. 17 of 2011) includes two layers of supervision:

internal, carried out by the leadership of the intelligence unit, and external, carried out by the Indonesian House of Representatives through the intelligence commission. However, the intelligence oversight approach in Indonesia is multi-actor, involving various entities, including related ministries, the House of Representatives (Komisi 1 DPR RI), the District Court, and state institutions such as the BPK and Komnas HAM. FGD participants also agreed that there is an urgency to expand intelligence oversight, particularly at the fourth level, namely, civil society or independent groups. This will allow these two entities to provide criticism and advice regarding alleged intelligence irregularities.

In addition, the FGD participants also saw that the multi-layered oversight model maintains a balance between state security, individual rights, and democratic principles. In a democratic system, intelligence oversight faces challenges in balancing operational secrecy with demands for transparency. While secrecy is necessary for effectiveness, transparency is essential for accountability.

FGD participants also explained that in Indonesia, external oversight of intelligence implementation is regulated by the Intelligence Law, specifically Article 43, paragraphs 2 and 3, which state that supervision is carried out by a commission in the Indonesian House of Representatives (Komisi 1 DPR RI) that handles intelligence affairs. In addition, the Indonesian House of Representatives has Regulation Number 2 of 2014, which regulates the oversight mechanism for the implementation of state intelligence through the State Intelligence Oversight Team.

It is explained that the Judiciary's function also aims to ensure that intelligence activities remain within the law and do not violate human rights (HAM). Thus, the implementation of intelligence must comply with the constitution and applicable legal regulations, and must not violate the rights of Indonesian or foreign citizens. The Judiciary also has an important role in granting surveillance or search permits needed for intelligence activities, ensuring that each investigation target is truly a threat to national security.

In more detail, the Executive Director of Makara Strategic Insight (MSI) Research observed that internal oversight is already in place within the current system. Meanwhile, the second layer of oversight is also carried out by the President, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), and the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM). The legislature's oversight role is also in place with the existence of Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives. However, he sees an urgency to expand intelligence oversight to the fourth layer, namely by including oversight from civil society groups and independent entities. Meanwhile, a senior researcher at Vox Point also noted that internal oversight is already in place at the first layer, and oversight from the president and the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) is also in place as intelligence oversight at the second layer. He also noted the availability of intelligence oversight at the third layer through Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives, and the urgency of expanding oversight to the fourth layer through the role of civil society groups. The Coordinator of Analysts of the Central Intelligence Committee (Kominpus) also agreed that internal oversight has been fulfilled and that the oversight functions of the president, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), and the judiciary are in place. This is evident in the court-issued

permits required to conduct certain intelligence activities. He also stated that legislative intelligence oversight is not carried out solely by Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives, but also by an intelligence oversight team in accordance with DPR Regulation No. 2 of 2014. He also agreed to expand intelligence oversight to a fourth layer, involving independent entities. Senior researchers at the BIN Research Center and a senior researcher at LPKN agreed that internal oversight is in place at the first layer, and that oversight from the President, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), and the judiciary is also sufficient. Both also agreed that intelligence oversight by Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives (Komisi 1 DPR RI), as the legislature, is also in place. They also agreed to expand intelligence oversight to the fourth layer by involving civil society groups and independent entities. However, senior researchers at the BIN Research Center saw that there were additional actors who also carried out supervision at the second and third layers, namely the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) at the second layer, which monitored the intelligence budget, and at the third layer, there was an intelligence monitoring team which monitored intelligence performance.

Table 2. Multi-layered Oversight System Actors

MULTI-LAYER OVERSIGHT SYSTEM ACTORS		
No.	Current	Expected
1.	Internal	Internal
2.	Executive	Executive
3.	Legislature	Legislature
4.	Judiciary	Judiciary
5.	X	Civil Society
6.	X	Independent Entity

Source: Processed by the Authors Based on Research Result, 2025

Intelligence Oversight Effectiveness Indicators

Based on literature reviews, the effectiveness of intelligence oversight is crucial to ensuring oversight runs efficiently and in line with objectives. Effectiveness can be measured through five main indicators. The first is punctuality, which demonstrates the supervisor's ability to perform the supervisory function at the right time. Punctuality is important to ensure that every step taken can have a positive impact on the organization. Second, the accuracy of cost calculations reflects the supervisor's ability to manage financial resources efficiently, ensuring that the budget used provides maximum value and supports the goals set. Furthermore, measurement accuracy is an important indicator in assessing the effectiveness of Intelligence Oversight. Oversight must be able to use relevant and objective measuring instruments to provide an accurate evaluation of organizational performance. Fourth, the accuracy of executing orders ensures that instructions are given clearly and are well understood, so as not to cause misunderstandings that can hinder goal achievement. Finally, accuracy in setting supervisory objectives is key to ensuring that supervisory efforts are focused and in accordance with the desired targets (Makmur, 2015).

In the context of intelligence oversight, the effectiveness of legislative oversight is determined by five main parameters: supervisory mandate, committee membership, budget control, investigative authority, and access to classified information. The supervisory mandate provides legal legitimacy, while competent, experienced membership enhances oversight quality. Budget control enables evaluation of fund use, investigative authority allows uncovering irregularities, and access to classified information enables in-depth oversight of intelligence operations (Born, 2004).

The results of the literature review were then followed up with interviews with the Head of the CSIS Papua Working Group, who stated that the effectiveness of intelligence oversight is urgent to ensure oversight runs efficiently and effectively. Interviewees considered the presence of the determinants Punctuality, Cost Accuracy, and Measurement Accuracy to be crucial. The absence of these determinants could lead to discrepancies between the problems detected and the problem-solving steps taken by intelligence entities. This can occur because oversight implementation is not aligned with the potential moment of irregularities.

Meanwhile, the results of an in-depth interview with the Coordinator of the Political Working Group-Lentera Research Institute indicated that the absence of the determinants Punctuality, Cost Accuracy, and Measurement Accuracy can potentially pose a threat of overvaluation. performance, financial accountability, and threat assessments become unaccountable and potentially subjective. This can occur because the resources owned by the supervisory entity are not adequate to oversee potential irregularities. In addition, Oversight becomes unable to use relevant and objective measurement instruments to provide an accurate evaluation of intelligence organizational performance.

The results of the literature study and interviews were then followed up with FGD as a form of triangulation validation and member checking. FGDs were conducted by inviting the Executive Director of the Center for Intelligence and Strategic Studies (CISS), a senior researcher at Vox Point, the Coordinator of the Central Intelligence Committee (Kominpus) Analysts, senior researchers at the BIN Research Center, and the Head of the STIN Strategic Studies Center. The criteria for FGD interviewees included having attended intelligence training, had more than 15 years of intelligence experience, or having formal intelligence education. The FGD (Focus Group Discussion) was held in Depok, West Java, in January 2025.

In the FGD, the Executive Director of the Center for Intelligence and Strategic Studies (CISS) and a senior researcher at Vox Point stated that they fully agree with the urgency of the five key indicators developed by Makmur for the intelligence oversight process. First, Punctuality; second, accuracy of cost calculations; third, accuracy of measurements; fourth, accuracy of order execution to ensure that instructions are given clearly and easily understood, thus avoiding misunderstandings that could hinder the achievement of objectives; and fifth, accuracy in setting oversight objectives. Both also agreed on the importance of Born's five key parameters for intelligence oversight: oversight mandate, committee membership, budgetary control, investigative authority, and access to classified information. Both saw the oversight mandate as providing legal legitimacy, while competent and experienced membership enhanced oversight. Both also noted that

budgetary control enabled evaluation of fund use, investigative authority enabled uncovering irregularities, and access to classified information enabled in-depth oversight of intelligence operations. Meanwhile, the analyst-coordinator of the Central Intelligence Committee (Kominpus) and a senior researcher at the BIN Research Center agreed on the existence of determinants of punctuality and cost accuracy. They also agreed on the existence of determinants of order execution accuracy and of oversight objective determination accuracy. These four Makmur Keliat's determinants would make the intelligence oversight process more effective and efficient. However, both believed that the existence of the Measurement Accuracy determinant should be limited, given that knowledge of clandestine methods remains limited. Regarding Born's intelligence oversight authority, they believe the Supervisory Mandate and Investigative Powers should be limited, in line with the principle of secrecy in intelligence activities. However, they fully agree on the authority of Budget Control and Committee Membership, given that Indonesia is a democratic country. Both also agreed that strict Access to Confidentiality mechanisms must be implemented, as intelligence information is protected by applicable law. Meanwhile, the Head of the STIN Strategic Studies Center agreed with the existence of Makmur Keliat's five determinants related to the oversight process. He also agreed with Born's determination of budget control and committee membership regarding intelligence oversight. However, he placed limitations on the Supervisory Mandate and investigative power. He also noted the urgency of strict enforcement of Access to Confidentiality, given the unique nature of intelligence work and its interconnectedness with national interests and national security.

Table 3. Second FGD Result

Determinant\ Participants	Punctuality	Cost Accuracy	Measurement Accuracy	Accuracy of Order Execution	Accuracy in Determining Objectives	Supervisory Mandate	Budget Control	Committee Membership	Investigative Powers	Access to Confidential Information
CISS	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Vox Point	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Kominpus	Agree	Agree	Limited	Agree	Agree	Limited	Agree	Agree	Limited	Strict
BIN Research Center	Agree	Agree	Limited	Agree	Agree	Limited	Agree	Agree	Limited	Strict
STIN Strategic Studies Center	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Limited	Agree	Agree	Limited	Strict

Source: Processed by the Authors Based on Research Result, 2026

It was concluded that to overcome these challenges, a strict information security mechanism must be implemented. Committee members must undergo a strict selection process and receive specialized training on the importance of and how to maintain the confidentiality of information. In addition, there must be clear procedures and security

protocols for accessing, storing, and sharing classified information. Any violation of this protocol must be subject to strict sanctions to ensure that classified information remains secure.

Overall, the FGD found that access to classified information enables the oversight committee to carry out its duties effectively and comprehensively, providing a basis for transparent and accountable oversight. This is important to maintain public trust in the intelligence agency. With such access, the committee can ensure that intelligence operations are carried out in accordance with legal and ethical principles, and can make corrections and adjustments as needed to improve the performance and integrity of the intelligence agency.

In addition, the interviewees observed that the five parameters proposed by Born (2005) provide a framework for accountable and effective legislative oversight of the intelligence agency. By implementing these parameters, legislators can ensure that the intelligence agency operates in accordance with the established principles of democracy, law, and ethics. Interviewees found that the indicators of intelligence oversight effectiveness in Indonesia currently meet seven criteria: the accuracy of order execution, goal-setting accuracy, mandate of supervision, budget control, committee membership, investigative authority, and access to classified information. Meanwhile, for three indicators, interviewees have not found their availability in Indonesia's intelligence oversight system. The three indicators include timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy. Therefore, to optimize the effectiveness of intelligence supervision in Indonesia, it is also necessary to add indicators for timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy of national security intelligence performance.

Table 4. Indicators of Intelligence Oversight Effectiveness

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT EFFECTIVENESS INDICATORS		
No.	Current	Expected
1.	X	Punctuality
2.	X	Cost Accuracy
3.	X	Measurement Accuracy
4.	Accuracy of Order Execution	Accuracy of Order Execution
5.	Accuracy in Determining Goals	Accuracy in Determining Goals
6.	Supervisory Mandate	Supervisory Mandate
7.	Budget Control	Budget Control
8.	Committee Membership	Committee Membership
9.	Investigative Powers	Investigative Powers
10.	Access to Confidential Information	Access to Confidential Information

Source: Processed by the Authors, 2025

Optimizing the National Security Intelligence Oversight Model

Based on Miles and Huberman's qualitative analysis, there is an urgent need to optimize multi-layered oversight of intelligence in the national security sector. In this regard, the involvement of civil society entities and the existence of a new independent supervisory body are needed. In addition, it is necessary to add indicators of the effectiveness of intelligence supervision related to timeliness, cost, and the accuracy of measuring the performance of national security intelligence in Indonesia.

The results of the analysis also show that multi-layered intelligence supervision of national security intelligence entities still has many shortcomings, especially in supervision by external actors. Supervision is mostly carried out internally, which limits the effectiveness and efficiency of national security intelligence operations. The public demands increased professionalism, transparency, fairness, accountability, and consistency in national security intelligence duties, especially in the context of democracy and human rights enforcement. Although there is an external supervisory function through the legislature, this supervision is often reactive and limited. Some of the obstacles faced include the ad hoc nature of supervision, issues of information confidentiality, and limited human resources and technical expertise within supervisory institutions. In addition, the lack of coordination among supervisory institutions, the minimal involvement of independent institutions, and the community are obstacles to effective supervision.

This condition can reduce public trust in national security intelligence. Therefore, efforts are needed to strengthen external oversight mechanisms, including increasing the number of supervisory actors, enhancing supervisory institutions' capacity, and improving coordination among supervisory institutions. With these improvements, national security intelligence is expected to operate with greater legitimacy and in accordance with the principles of good governance.

The results of the analysis of data from interviews and FGDs indicate that, in the context of intelligence reform in Indonesia, significant steps of change are also an integral part of overall security reform. The importance of this reform cannot rest solely on state intelligence actors; it requires broad support from various stakeholders.

For this reform process to run smoothly, the state intelligence agency must be supported by robust internal and external oversight mechanisms from relevant regulatory authorities. Within this framework, establishing a new independent supervisory entity and involving civil society are important steps toward strengthening the external oversight function of national security intelligence. aims to become a professional, responsible, efficient entity, and in line with the principles of developing democracy. Through the new independent oversight body and the involvement of civil society, the government is seeking to create a more transparent and open oversight mechanism to increase the accountability and credibility of national security intelligence in the eyes of the public.

With the establishment of a new independent supervisory body and the involvement of civil society, it is hoped that the monitoring of national security intelligence activities can be carried out more effectively and comprehensively. The new independent supervisory entity and civil society will provide an additional layer of external supervision and diverse perspectives on the activities of state-owned national security intelligence entities. This is important to ensure that state intelligence policies and actions are in accordance with the principles of democracy, human rights, and community values mandated by the constitution.

The results of the qualitative analysis in this study also show that indicators of the effectiveness of intelligence supervision in Indonesia have not been able to measure the

timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy of national security intelligence entities in carrying out their duties and functions, namely, early detection and early prevention of various national security threats. The absence of indicators of supervision effectiveness related to timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy results in the analysis results produced in the form of threat assessments being biased, so that national security intelligence accountability is not met. In the absence of such accountability, national security intelligence cannot fully account for every step taken in carrying out its duties and functions in a governance system.

The paradox between openness and secrecy in intelligence is a challenge in a democratic country. Intelligence, for its effectiveness, must remain secret, but accountability is still needed to maintain democratic principles. In Indonesia, the principle of information security is regulated by Law Number 17 of 2011.

Good governance, including accountability, is the foundation of a democratic country. This principle is also applied to intelligence management, with a checks-and-balances mechanism to prevent the abuse of power and ensure that intelligence operations are carried out responsibly. In this context, intelligence functions as a guardian of democracy by identifying non-traditional threats, such as economic, social, and cultural threats, which are increasingly relevant in the era of globalization. Intelligence is expected to detect threats as early as possible so preventive measures can be taken. However, the potential for bias in threat assessment is also a challenge, especially if intelligence is misused for political interests, as has happened in several countries in the past.

Table 5. National Security Intelligence Oversight Model

National Security Intelligence Oversight Model		
No.	Multi-layered Intelligence Oversight System Actors	Effectiveness Indicators
1.	Internal	Punctuality
2.	Executive	Cost Accuracy
3.	Legislature	Measurement Accuracy
4.	Judiciary	Accuracy of Order Execution
5.	Civil Society	Accuracy in Determining Goals
6.	Independent Entity	Supervisory Mandate
7.		Budget Control
8.		Committee Membership
9.		Investigative Powers
10.		Access to Confidential Information

Source: Processed by the Authors, 2025

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

This study concludes that weaknesses remain in intelligence oversight in the field of national security. The layered oversight system currently applied to the national security intelligence oversight mechanism covers only four of the six supervisory actors, including actors within the intelligence agency itself, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. In addition, weaknesses in the intelligence supervision system were identified, including a lack of three indicators of supervision effectiveness. The indicators of intelligence oversight effectiveness in the current intelligence supervision system consist of only

seven: accuracy in executing orders, accuracy in determining objectives, supervisory mandate, budget control, committee membership, investigative authority, and access to confidential information. To optimize the state intelligence oversight system to ensure accountability in Indonesian democracy, it is necessary to involve civil society entities and new independent oversight entities, and to add three indicators of oversight effectiveness, including timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy. The academic benefit of this research is to provide knowledge about the equilibrium between intelligence and democracy, so that stakeholders can see the urgency of improving existing intelligence oversight.

The recommendation in this study is to optimize multi-layered intelligence oversight in the national security sector. Policy makers, such as executives, legislative bodies, and civil society groups, must begin reforming the existing intelligence oversight system. In this regard, the involvement of civil society entities and the existence of a new independent supervisory entity are needed. In addition, it is necessary to add indicators of the effectiveness of intelligence supervision, including timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy of national security intelligence performance in Indonesia. It is hoped that through optimizing multi-layered intelligence supervision in the national security sector.

The limitation of this study is that the impact of the absence of civil society involvement and of a new independent oversight body for Indonesian democracy has not been measured. In addition, this study has not been able to measure the impact of the absence of indicators of the effectiveness of intelligence supervision on timeliness, cost accuracy, and measurement accuracy of democratic values in Indonesia. Therefore, to obtain measurable knowledge of potential threats, it is recommended to conduct a risk assessment of the impacts of the absence of civil society actors and independent entities, as well as the absence of indicators of the effectiveness of intelligence oversight related to timeliness, cost, accuracy, and measurement accuracy.

REFERENCES

- Ansori, A., Hasanah, P., Pratiwi, R. I., & Afrida, M. (2024). Konsep Influence, Power, Empowerment dan Politik. *Inovasi: Jurnal Ilmiah Pengembangan Pendidikan*, 2(3), 160–165.
- Arbani, M. (2023). Peran Intelijen Dalam Keberlangsungan Demokrasi Dan Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia. *Syntax Admiration*, 4(8). <https://doi.org/10.46799/jsa.v4i7.671>
- Astarini, D. R. S., & Rofii, M. (2021). Siber Intelijen Untuk Keamanan Nasional. *Jurnal Renaissance*, 6(1), 703–709.
- Born, H. (2004). Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services: Lessons Learned from Comparing National Practices. *Connections*, 3(4), 1–12.
- Born, H., & Leight, I. (2005). *Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice*. House of the Parliament of Norway.
- Bruneau, T. C., & Dombroski, K. R. (2021). *Reforming intelligence: The challenge of control in new democracies*. In *Who guards the guardians and how*. University of Texas Press.

- Dzikrullah, A., & Julianto, N. (2024). Tata Kelola Intelijen: Netralitas BIN Dalam Politik Kepentingan. *Jurnal Kajian Strategik Ketahanan Nasional*, 7(1). <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkskn.v7i1.10091>
- Fadhallah, R. A. (2025). *Wawancara*. UNJ Press.
- Fernando, Y. (2019a). Identifikasi Ancaman PCI (Positif Clandestine Intelligence) Berbentuk Cyber Terrorism Terhadap Keamanan Nasional. *Jurnal Kajian Strategik Ketahanan Nasional*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkskn.v2i1.10017>
- Fernando, Y. (2019b). Pelibatan Organisasi Masyarakat Dalam Intelijen Keamanan Nasional. *Jurnal Kajian Strategik Ketahanan Nasional*, 2(2). <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkskn.v2i2.10023>
- Fernando, Y. (2025). *Urgensi Pengawasan Intelijen Terkait Akurasi Pengukuran Dalam Koordinasi Intelijen Negara: Studi Tentang Penilaian Ancaman Keamanan Nasional Pada Komite Intelijen Pusat*. Universitas Indonesia.
- Flint, C. (2022). *Aesthetics: Introduction to Geopolitics*. (4th. Ed.). Taylor & Francis (Routledge).
- Gill, P. (2003). *Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence Services after September 11th*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. Working Paper No. 103.
- Gill, P. (2009). *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. In Johnson K. Loch. *Theories of Security Intelligence*. Oxford University Press.
- Hamtat, F. (2021). "Menguak Kabut Pengawasan Intelijen". Politik-BRIN, P. R.
- Harahap, M., Lubis, M., & Purba, N. (2021). Peran Intelijen Kejaksaaan Dalam Mengungkap Perkara tindak Pidana Korupsi. *Jurnal Ilmiah METADATA*, 3(3).
- Haripin, M. (2022). *Membangun intelijen profesional di Indonesia: Menangkal ancaman, menjaga kebebasan*. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.
- Hulnick, A. S. W. (1999). Openness: Being Public About Secret Intelligence. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 12(2).
- Ilhami, M. W., Nurfajriani, W. V., Mahendra, A., Sirodj, R. A., & Afgani, M. W. (2024). Application of the Case Study Method in Qualitative Research. *Jurnal Ilmiah Wahana Pendidikan*, 10(9), 462–469. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11180129>
- Imanina, K. (2025). Penggunaan Metode Kualitatif Dengan Pendekatan Deskriptif Analitis Dalam Paud. *JURNAL AUDI: Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Ilmu Anak Dan Media Informasi PAUD*, 10(1), 37–40. <https://doi.org/10.33061/jai.v10i1.3728>
- Makmur, H. (2015). *Efektifitas Kebijakan Kelembagaan Pengawasan*. PT Refika Aitama.
- Mayangsari, E. G. (2024). Analisis Demokrasi Intelijen Terhadap Penanganan Teroris Indonesia (Perbandingan Dengan MI6). *Mutiara: Multidiciplinary Scientifict Journal*, 2(4), 191–197.
- Putri, S. (2024). *Kebijakan Hukum Pidana Terhadap Kerahasiaan Intelijen Negara Dalam Perspektif Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Di Indonesia*. Universitas Jambi.
- Ramdhani, M. (2021). *Metode Penelitian*. Cipta Media Nusantara.
- Robertson, K. G. (1998). *Recent Reform of Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Democratization or Risk Management*. *Intelligence and National Security*. Taylor & Francis.
- Runturambi, A. J. S., & Kusdiarto, S. H. (2023). Analisis Ancaman dan Adaptasi Unit Intelijen DJBC Dalam Mendukung Ketahanan Nasional Di Bidang Ekonomi Dalam Perspektif Intelijen Strategis. *Jurnal Lemhannas RI*, 11(1), 58–71. <https://doi.org/10.55960/jlri.v11i1.425>
- Sekaran, U., & Bougie, R. (2020). *Research Methods For Business: A Skill Building Approach*. (Asia Edition (8th. ed.)). John Wiley & Sons.

- Sirait, S., & Abdillah, J. (2025). Peran Intelijen Keamanan Dalam Pencegahan Dan Penanggulangan Tindak Pidana Terorisme. *Jurnal USM Law Review*, 8(2), 673–686. <https://doi.org/10.26623/julr.v8i2.11952>
- Sugarda, Y. B. (2020). *Panduan praktis pelaksanaan focus group discussion sebagai metode riset kualitatif*. Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Undang-Undang Intelijen Negara., No. 17 (2011).
- Yanuarti, S. (2017). Dinamika Pengawasan Intelijen di Indonesia. *Intelijen dalam Pusaran Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*. Jakarta. Andi dan LIPI.