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**INDONESIA'S PERSPECTIVE AND POSSIBLE STRATEGIES
AS THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF ASEAN 2023 IN RESPONDING
THE EMERGENCE OF AUSTRALIA-UK-USA DEFENSE
PACT**

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby declare that this thesis does not contain part or all of the previously published works that have been submitted to obtain a degree at any university; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, there are no words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, sub-chapters, or chapters that have been published or written by other people, except those that are written in this thesis and mentioned in the References section.

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FOREWORDS

The researcher would like to begin this forewords by expressing my gratitude to Jesus the Lord and almighty God, whose divine guidance and blessings have been instrumental in bringing this thesis with the title "Indonesia's Perspective and Possible Strategies as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Responding The Emergence of Australia-UK-USA Defense Pact " can be completed.

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Researchers are aware of flaws in this research, so it requires constructive criticism, suggestions, and guidance from all parties who may be able to assist in developing the research. Hopefully, the researcher's thesis will be

useful for the advancement of the study of Defense Science, particularly Defense Diplomacy, and will add to the body of knowledge for other parties who will require it in the future. Thank you.

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ABSTRACT

“Indonesia’s Perspective and Possible Strategies as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Responding The Emergence of Australia-UK-USA Defense Pact”

Alma Evelinda Silalahi

AUKUS has the potential to increase militarization or instability in the region. As the ASEAN 2023 chairmanship, Indonesia expresses significant worry regarding any possible escalation of tensions within the region and the potential consequences AUKUS may have on the security of the region. Should AUKUS result in external powers gaining more influence in the area, this may weaken ASEAN's position as a key player in advancing stability and security within the region. Hence, this research aims to find out the perspective and Indonesia's possible strategies on behalf of ASEAN as the chairmanship this year in responding to the emergence of AUKUS. The research method used in this study is qualitative, specifically utilizing a qualitative descriptive research design. To gather information, interviews were conducted alongside a comprehensive review of relevant literature. Then the data is processed with a SWOT analysis to determine a strategy related to Indonesia's possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert ASEAN Centrality. According to the results, the emergence of AUKUS has brought ASEAN into a security dilemma, triggering an arms race in the region and potentially impacting the military power balance. Indonesia, as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023, is committed to building a stronger and united ASEAN to maintain its centrality and promote regional stability. The use of the SO (Strengths-Opportunities) strategy, including diplomatic efforts, economic cooperation, and ASEAN-led multilateralism, can help Indonesia to assert ASEAN centrality and promote regional cooperation, stability, and resilience in response to AUKUS.

Keywords: ASEAN, AUKUS, Chairmanship of ASEAN

ABSTRAK

“Perspektif Indonesia dan Strategi yang Mungkin sebagai Ketua ASEAN 2023 dalam Menanggapi Munculnya Pakta Pertahanan Australia-Inggris-Amerika Serikat”

Alma Evelinda Silalahi

Aukus memiliki potensi untuk meningkatkan militerisasi atau ketidakstabilan di kawasan. Indonesia sebagai kepemimpinan ASEAN 2023 sangat prihatin dengan potensi peningkatan ketegangan di kawasan dan dampaknya pada keamanan regional. Jika Aukus mengarah pada peran yang lebih besar untuk kekuatan eksternal di wilayah tersebut, ini dapat berdampak pada sentralitas ASEAN untuk memainkan peran utama dalam mempromosikan stabilitas dan keamanan regional. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana perspektif dan strategi yang dapat Indonesia lakukan atas nama ASEAN sebagai keketuaan ASEAN 2023 tahun ini untuk menyikapi kemunculan AUKUS. Studi ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan desain penelitian deskriptif kualitatif. Pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui wawancara dan studi literatur yang komprehensif. Kemudian data diproses dengan analisis SWOT untuk menentukan strategi yang terkait dengan strategi Indonesia yang mungkin sebagai ketua ASEAN 2023 untuk menegaskan sentralitas ASEAN. Hasilnya menunjukkan munculnya AUKUS telah membawa ASEAN ke dalam dilema keamanan, memicu perlombaan senjata di kawasan dan berpotensi memengaruhi keseimbangan kekuatan militer. Indonesia, sebagai ketua ASEAN 2023, berkomitmen untuk membangun ASEAN yang lebih kuat dan bersatu untuk menjaga kepentingannya dan mempromosikan stabilitas regional. Penggunaan strategi SO (Strengths-Opportunities), termasuk upaya diplomatik, kerja sama ekonomi, dan multilateralisme yang dipimpin oleh ASEAN, dapat membantu Indonesia menegaskan sentralitas ASEAN dan mempromosikan kerja sama regional, stabilitas, dan ketahanan dalam merespons AUKUS.

Kata Kunci: ASEAN, AUKUS, Keketuaan ASEAN

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ADMM : ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting
ADMM Plus : ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus
AOIP : ASEAN Outlook Indo Pacific
ARF : ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN : The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUKUS : Australia, UK, US
BRI : Belt and Road Initiatives
CBMs : Confidence Building Measures
COC : Code of Conduct
EAS : East Asia Summit
EFAS : External Strategy Factor Analysis Summary
EU : European Union
HR : Human Resource
IFAS : Internal Strategy Factor Analysis Summary
QUAD: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RSCT : Regional Security Complex Theory
SEANWFZ : South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
SCS : South China Sea
SWOT : Strengths Weaknesses Opportunity Threats
TNI : Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)
UK : United Kingdom
UN : United Nations
UNCLOS : United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US : United States
USA : United States of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

AUKUS (Australia, UK, USA), a new defense agreement, was established on September 15th, 2021 by the President of the United States, Joe Biden, the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, and the Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison. AUKUS, which stands for Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, is a three-state defense agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (USA). Under the agreement, the USA and UK will help Australia develop and deploy nuclear-powered submarines and deploy Western militaries in the Pacific region (Prakoso, 2021).

The establishment of the AUKUS cooperation is intended to enhance security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. This trilateral cooperation aims not only to build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, but also to enhance cyber security, artificial intelligence, and cooperation in underwater security (Singarimbun, 2021a).

AUKUS can be said to be a continuation of America's strategy to counter China's influence in the region. China's influence is increasingly massive due to several policies of the largest country in Asia, such as the Nine-Dash Line, One China Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to significant economic and military improvements every year (Santoso, 2021). Previously, the United States had also strengthened cooperation between the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and Five Eyes as an effort to counter China's developments. In the framework of AUKUS cooperation, Australia is seen as the main supporting power base if the conflict escalates between America and China in the Indo-Pacific.

As a first step, AUKUS is currently focusing on building nuclear-powered submarines for the Australian Navy. Australia will become the seventh state

in the world to operate a nuclear-powered submarine. The technology will allow Australia to have submarines that are faster to go and harder to detect than a conventional submarine fleet. Nuclear-powered submarines can dive for months and can fire missiles further—though Australia has made it clear it has no intention of deploying nuclear warheads (BBC News, 2021). This shows that the three states have drawn a line and warded off Cina's aggressive actions in the region.

The region of Southeast Asia, comprising states like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, has been closely monitoring the progression of the China-US rivalry. Many of these states have close economic relations with China, but they also rely on the US and another Western nationss for defense & security support. AUKUS could potentially impact these relationships and further complicate the already complex geopolitical situation in the region (Nurfauzi et al., 2022).

Geopolitically, Southeast Asia has become one of the most strategic areas. This condition has consequences for many foreign interests, which often clash with the interests of nations in the Southeast Asian. This interest has always been dominated by the efforts of foreign states to create stability in the region for the sake of security for their state which has to deal with the defense interests of nations in the Southeast Asian. This condition was strengthened by the wave of globalization which then blurred regional boundaries and created what is called regional integration in various fields. These then have consequences on the interdependence of states in the region. Regional dynamics related to security and defense have consequences on the behavior of states, especially those in Southeast Asia (Rusfiana, 2018).

AUKUS can be viewed as an effort to tackle the perceived asymmetry in the regional power balance, which is due to China's military expansion and forcefulness. ASEAN member states gave various responses to AUKUS. Malaysia and Indonesia voiced their concerns regarding the

potential threats of an arms race, while Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines were generally more open to the agreement (Choong & Storey, 2021). Despite responses from each member state, ASEAN, as the closest regional organization will be heavily influenced by AUKUS both in current times and in the future. The concern that Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 is pursuing the Bangkok Treaty or the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) might also be affected.

As the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 is also important to see how the current relationship particularly in defense and security field between Indonesia and AUKUS member states. Hence through the patterns of these relationship the ideal possible strategies to response the emergence of AUKUS can be arranged.

The US has provided assistance to Indonesia in areas such as counterterrorism, disaster response, and maritime security. In 2020, the US approved the sale of eight Apache helicopters to Indonesia, which will be used for anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare (HeliHub, 2020). Despite concerns about the emergence of AUKUS, the US and Indonesia have continued to conduct joint naval exercises. In September 2021, the two states held a naval exercise in the Java Sea, involving US Navy ships and Indonesian warships and submarines. The exercise aimed to improve interoperability and enhance maritime security (Archus, 2021). Both states have continued to work together on various defense and security issues despite concerns about the emergence of AUKUS.

In defense procurement field, in 1990s, the UK government approved the sale of 11 Hawk trainer jets to Indonesia, which will be used to train the state's pilots. The UK has also provided assistance to Indonesia in areas such as counterterrorism, disaster response, and maritime security (Bramasta, 2022). Indonesia and the UK have a history of military cooperation, including joint exercises and training programs. In September 2021, both states are involved in a joint military exercise called Garuda

Shield, which involved over 500 soldiers from both Indonesia and UK. The exercise aimed to improve interoperability and enhance the ability of both militaries to respond to regional security challenges (U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 2022). In the term of ASEAN, despite concerns about AUKUS, the UK has expressed support for ASEAN and its role in the region. In September 2021, UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab met with ASEAN leaders in Jakarta to discuss regional security issues, including the South China Sea and the coup in Myanmar (Storey & Ha, 2021).

Prior to AUKUS, Indonesia and Australia are under Lombok Treaty as their guidance in conducting bilateral relations, both in security and non-security sector. As the main purpose of this treaty is, as quoted, 'to maintain a shared goal of peace, security and prosperity in the region and recognize the importance of close cooperation on matters affecting their common security as well as their respective national security,' (Lombok Treaty, 2006). This agreement is used to ensure their commitment to maintain each other's national interest, hence they make the agreement beneficial for each other. Lombok Treaty is also specifically focused on cooperating in combating terrorism, transnational crime, cooperating in defense, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, maritime security and emergency issues (Lombok Treaty, 2006). As both states shared the same national interest to maintain border stability, preventing spies to invade in the middle of both borders and also other national interest such as counterterrorism and transnational crime, highlighted the national interest for both states to protect their national interest.

Indonesia take on the role of ASEAN Chairmanship in 2023 and assume a prominent position in fostering collaboration among the region's states and dealing with issues such as the emergence of AUKUS. Quoting from the ASEAN Charter Article 32, Member States holding the Chair of ASEAN are required to:

- a. promote and enhance the interests and wellbeing of ASEAN, including efforts to build an ASEAN Community through policy initiatives, coordination, consensus and cooperation;
- b. ensure the centrality of ASEAN;
- c. ensure an effective and timely response to urgent issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN, including providing its good offices and such other arrangements to immediately address these concerns;
- d. represent ASEAN in strengthening and promoting closer relations with external partners; and
- e. carry out such other tasks and functions as may be mandated.

Based on the statements above Indonesia's role as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 will be to promote regional cooperation and integration, enhance ASEAN's profile and influence, facilitate dialogue and cooperation with external partners, ensure regional peace and stability, and uphold the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN's principles. But the emergence of AUKUS could potentially disrupt this delicate balance and complicate Indonesia's efforts to sustain a serene and secure regional atmosphere.

Furthermore, the AUKUS partnership has sparked concerns from Indonesia about the potential for increased militarization in the region, which could exacerbate tensions and lead to a potential arms race. It can be seen from statement that released on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia's official web page, admitting the concern of the possible arms race and power projection in the region. Apart from emphasizing the significance of Australia's adherence to its obligations on nuclear proliferation and upholding regional tranquility, Indonesia also extended an invitation to all relevant parties to engage in a peaceful discussion to address the matter (Statement on Australia's Nuclear-Powered Submarines Program, 2021). Indonesia, as the chair of ASEAN in 2023, will need to navigate these complex issues and work to promote dialogue and cooperation among all parties involved.

The researcher quotes from the vision of Indonesia's Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023, that Indonesia targets to produce various priority missions and strategies, among which the most important is efforts to strengthen ASEAN institutions that are adaptive and agile and build a stronger centrality of ASEAN so that it has more resilience in facing various potential crises in future. Indonesia will take on a leading role in guiding ASEAN to review its institutional capability and efficacy by means of these two aspects. This will enable ASEAN to overcome the issues it encounters in the region and globally, including managing the escalation of rivalries and power projection by major states, as well as potential conflicts and tensions in the South China Sea (Putro, 2021).

Indonesia is deeply concerned about any potential escalation of tensions in the region and the impacts AUKUS might have on security of the region. If AUKUS leads to a greater role for external powers in the region, this is an obstacle to Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to play a leading role in promoting regional stability and security. Hence, this research aims to find out the perspective and possible strategies for Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS.

1.2 Focus and Sub-Focus

This research was conducted to provide viewpoints regarding the perspective and possible strategies for Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS. Hence, the focus of this research is "Examining The Role of Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to The Emergence of AUKUS" and the sub-focus of this research was developed into 2 (two) sub focuses, namely;

1. The Perspective of Indonesia as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS.

2. Indonesia possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS.

1.3 Research Problems

ASEAN is required to act in accordance with applicable norms and maintain its centrality without referring to one of the powers. From these issues, the problem for this research will be formulated into two questions as follows:

1. How is Indonesia's perspective as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS?
2. How does Indonesia possible strategize as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This research examines a relatively new phenomenon. Therefore, the researcher presents it thoroughly so that it can be understood in depth by the reader. Coherent with the research questions above, the researcher formulates the research objectives as follows:

1. Analysing the Perspective of Indonesia as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS.
2. Analysing Indonesia's possible strategize as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS.

1.5 Benefits of the Study

1.5.1 Theoretical Benefits

This research is expected to be a relevant and credible reference for academics in terms of substance and methodology in the realm of defense studies, international relations, and other related studies. This study is

anticipated to furnish an enrichment of knowledge about defense diplomacy, geopolitical dynamics, and geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific area, particularly concerning ASEAN's efforts to preserve its centrality following the emergence of AUKUS in the region.

1.5.2 Practical Benefits

This research can be used as input for defense stakeholders in Indonesia to formulate a more optimal cooperation strategy for the defense diplomacy strategy sector. This research can also be used as a recommendation for the government of the Republic of Indonesia as an ASEAN member country in formulating a policy of defense diplomacy strategy in responding to the emergence of AUKUS for security stability in the region. This research can also be the initial basis of study for students who have an interest in discussing issues related to defense cooperation, particularly concerning defense diplomacy and security stability in the region.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 National Defense

Quoting from the Regulation of the Minister of Defense Number 16 of 2012 concerning the Policy for Integrating Components of National Defense, national defense is all efforts to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation. The national defense attempts is undertaken while considering the dynamics of the threat that is being confronted.

The advancement of the strategic environment constantly leads to alterations in the intricacy of threats, encompassing both military and non-military threats. National defense serves to achieve and safeguard the entire territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a single defense unit. The government carries out national defense and readies it beforehand with the national defense system by developing and nurturing the capability and deterrence of the state and nation and dealing with any potential threats (Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan No 16 Tahun 2012 Tentang Kebijakan Pengintegrasian Komponen Pertahanan Negara, 2012).

Another definition according to Andi Widjajanto in his writing entitled "Evolution of Indonesian Defense Doctrine 1945-1998" provides the definition that National Defense is the basic principles that provide direction for the management of defense resources to achieve national security objectives which are translated into six (6) defense doctrine contents namely: the nation's perspective on war, the components of the countries involved in the war, the controllers of the war, and the war strategy. At the political level, the political principles of the doctrine contain several matters relating to the duty of the armed forces to deal with armed military threats.

At the military level, doctrine answers more questions about how military force will be used to deal with threats (Widjajanto, 2010).

So it can be concluded that national defense refers to views and thoughts regarding the objectives, principles, and strategies that must be adopted to maintain the security and integrity of the state. National defense can cover various aspects such as threats to national security, military doctrine, defense capabilities, and foreign policy strategies.

The main objective of National Defense is to safeguard the sovereignty of the state, protect the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, and ensure the safety of the entire nation against all types of internal and external threats and disturbances (Kristiyanto et al., 2022). Therefore, building a defense strategy policy requires a long-term road map, strategies that are integrated with the basic elements of both the military and the economy.

In this matter, a strategy is needed to organize national defense optimally to achieve national goals and interests. Defense strategy is a derivative of defense theory, as well as providing space for the possibility of flexibility at the strategic level. The defense strategy must ensure efficiency in the utilization of national resources to achieve defense objectives (Wardhana, 2016).

When formulating a national defense strategy and determining doctrinal policies and posture, it is necessary to take into account various factors, including (Tim Pokja Modul Pembinaan Kesadaran Bela Negara, 2019):

1. Geographical factors of the state based on the uniqueness of its identity as an archipelagic state. Not only the state itself, but also in relations with regional and global states in the geopolitical context.
2. National resources, analysis of possible threats that will arise. Both actual threats such as declining economic growth, border violations,

foreign intervention, rebellion, terrorism, espionage, biological weapons attacks, natural disasters, theft of natural resources, drug trafficking, foreign immigrants, the impact of the industrial revolution and other national defense issues.

3. Development of information technology. This exponential technological progress is under particular pressure because the strategic environmental changes are also triggered by the rapid revolution in information technology. Thus, giving birth to new potential threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances. The possibility of threats such as cyber warfare, energy and resource issues, advanced high-tech weapons, and the concept of military revolution are influenced by the integration of technology and the strategic environment of national defense.

The factors mentioned need to work together to create a planning strategy based on capabilities rather than solely on threats. This strategy should be able to adapt to the complexities and uncertainties of the global security environment (Yusgiantoro, 2014). In this case, the security dilemma is a result of the emergence of AUKUS which is said to be a counterbalance to China's increasing hegemony in a complex region, therefore, it is necessary to use the power of defense diplomacy to decrease tensions. Hence to examine the problems of this research, the next sub-chapter will explain the theory of defense diplomacy.

2.1.2 Defense Diplomacy

According to Winger, diplomacy in the field of defense cooperation is a peaceful way for the defense institutions of a country to cooperate with government institutions from other countries to achieve the desired results. Diplomacy is traditionally such as state visits, and international conferences are "direct" actions of soft power because it is a relationship between the government and the government in achieving the desired results (Winger, 2014):

In addition to the explanation of Winger, there is also an understanding related to diplomacy in the defense sector. Cottey and Forster in their book *Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Roles Of Military Cooperation And Assistance*, express an opinion regarding the view of defense diplomacy, that defense diplomacy has changed, where current defense diplomacy is not only based on a full political role in supporting armed forces and alliance security, but also as a means to pursue the goals and objectives of the broader security policy and foreign policy. Defense diplomacy according to Cottey and Forster explains that the old defense diplomacy emphasizes the goal of retaliation against the enemy, and the new defense diplomacy emphasizes more on cooperation with states that have potential as enemies, promoting democracy, good governance, and humanity and enabling states to be able to deal with security issues (Cottey & Forster, 2013).

The term defense diplomacy encompasses various activities, which were previously known as military assistance or cooperation. These activities are listed in the table provided by Cottey and Forster (Cottey & Forster, 2013):

Table 2.1
Defense Diplomacy Activities

No	Defense Diplomacy Activities
1	Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civil defense officers
2	Agreement from defense attache to the foreign state
3	Foreign military training and civil defense personnel
4	Provision of experts and advice on control democratically of armed forces, defense management, and military-technical areas
5	Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and military units and ship visits

6	Placement of military and civilian personnel in the partner state's defense ministry or armed forces
7	Deployment/placement of the training team
8	Provision of military equipment and material assistance
9	Bilateral and multilateral cooperation for training purposes
10	Bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation agreements

Source: Cottey & Forster, 2013

States may establish agreements for defense cooperation and offer military assistance to other nations for various reasons. These may include balancing or deterring against potential adversaries, addressing environmental challenges, aiding friendly nations in quelling domestic political unrest, or advancing trade interests such as arms sales or broader economic relationships. Defense diplomacy according to Cottey and Forster is then divided into three parts which are the points that explain the goals of defense diplomacy itself, which are as follows (Filovia, 2020):

1) Strategic Engagement

Strategic Engagement is part of the concept of diplomacy concerning the establishment of cooperative relations that show a commitment to defense cooperation, to support a condition of peace and stability in relations between states, as well as efforts to minimize opportunities for conflict between states. The establishment of an agreement or commitment to defense cooperation shows that defense diplomacy has succeeded in achieving its goals and objectives in the aspect of strategic cooperation.

2) Promoting Democratic Civil-Military Relations

Promoting democratic civil-military relations, in this aspect, defense diplomacy is expected to encourage democratic values in which there is a process of developing institutions, and norms that lead to democratic values. If this aspect is contained in the

cooperation relationship of defense diplomacy, then the objectives/targets of defense diplomacy are achieved.

3) Enhancing Peacekeeping Capabilities

Expanding peacekeeping capacities or building peace capabilities is an aspect that clarifies the objective of defense diplomacy as a means to promote the preservation of regional peace and stability (but not limited to regional cooperation relations), peace through defense cooperation based on the confidence building process, as contained in the strategic cooperation part. Hence if there are these elements in the defense diplomacy relationship, it can be said that defense diplomacy is in accordance with the target/objective or effective.

In terms of this research, it can be argued that defense diplomacy is an element of a strategic defense plan that involves using cooperative efforts to maintain peace and safeguard Indonesia's interests. The main aim of this action is to improve the defense capabilities of Indonesia and establish trust with other nations in Southeast Asia. It also aims to develop a shared understanding of security matters, particularly concerning the emergence of AUKUS, and help promote regional stability and peace. A state's defense diplomacy activities have three main characteristics, namely (Syawfi, 2009):

a. Defense Diplomacy for Confidence Building Measures

Defense diplomacy to build confidence building with other states aims to reduce tension or eliminate negative perceptions between states. This is done in a way that is mutually transparent in policies, especially in the development of military capabilities so that assumptions made by a state are not contemplated as a threat to other states (Acharya, 2014). Defense diplomacy in this research matter is carried out as a way to prevent security dilemmas that result in instability in the

regional and global environment which will eventually lead to the arms race.

b. Defense Diplomacy for Defense Capabilities

Defense diplomacy for defense capabilities is carried out in order to materially strengthen defense capabilities, items related to defense, such as equipment and other components used in defense. Diplomacy for defense capabilities is carried out through strategic cooperation in terms of military assistance, purchase of defense equipment (export credit), construction of military bases, provision of security umbrellas by core states to semi-periphery and periphery states and vice versa (Matthews, 2001). In addition, defense diplomacy is carried out to strengthen defense capabilities in dealing with traditional and non-traditional threats.

c. Defense Diplomacy for Defense Industries

Defense diplomacy for the defense industries is diplomacy that aims to develop and strengthen a state's defense industries. The outcome generated in this diplomacy is political and economic independence to reduce the level of interdependence or dependence of a state in the procurement of defense equipment. Defense diplomacy for defense industries is carried out through strategic cooperation between states in weapons production, cooperation in weapons development and research, licensing, investment in the defense industry, and technology transfer (Matthews, 2001).

As described earlier, this study considers defense diplomacy as a strategic tool to address defense and security issues faced by Southeast Asian states following the emergence of AUKUS. To respond to the stated research problem in this research, the most appropriate character of defense diplomacy is to achieve Confidence Building Measure (CBM) and efforts to force deterrence are prioritized over building offensive forces.

Furthermore, in order to achieve the theme of the ASEAN chairmanship theme for 2023, which is "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth", the implementation of defense diplomacy for Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is crucial in order to alleviate tensions and misunderstandings between the concerned parties (ASEAN member states and AUKUS member states) by being mutually open in their policies, transparency in developing capabilities its military so that Indonesia as chairman of ASEAN 2023 can emphasize the centrality of ASEAN.

2.1.3 Confidence Building Measures

According to Samina Yasmeen and Aabha Dixit (1995), Confidence Building Measures may be defined as mutually agreed actions taken by states, or groups of states, that set processes in motion that move parties from a condition of mutual hostility to one of reduced hostility or increased accommodation (Yasmeen & Dixit, 1995).

In line with the definition of Samina Yasmeen and Aabha Dixit before, Simon Mason and Matthias Siegfried (2013), explained that Confidence Building Measures can be understood as a series of actions that are negotiated, agreed and implemented by the conflict parties to build confidence, without specifically focusing on the root causes of the conflict (Mason & Siegfried, 2013).

From these two definitions, Confidence Building Measures can simply be interpreted as efforts to build mutual trust between countries at the unilateral, bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral levels which are carried out before, during, and after conflict with the main objective of reducing tensions, misperceptions, and uncertainty between the conflict parties.

Dong Wang and Xin Jiang in their article entitled 'Confidence Building Measures: European Experiences and Asia Pacific Practice' stated that CBM is not only carried out in the military realm, but also in the political, economic and socio-cultural realm in a wider range both at the unilateral

level , bilateral or multilateral. Reflecting on the experiences of states in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia Pacific, Wang and Jiang added that it is important to map the characteristics of potential conflicts first before deciding what CBM model is ideal to apply (Wang & Jiang, 2009). Meanwhile Higgins identified 5 (five) aspects to see the implementation of CBM, these five aspects are: communication measures, transparency measures, consultation measures, goodwill measures, and constraint measures (Higgins, 1991). The following is a table of CBM concepts in the military realm, which is derived down to the indicator level to make it easier for the researcher to map and analyze a proper CBM strategy in the Southeast Asian in response to the emergence of AUKUS.

Table 2.2

Confidence Building Measures Concept

Concept	Variable	Indicator	Parameter
5 Areas of CBM	<i>Communication Measures</i>	<i>Establish contact between parties</i>	Dialogue, both formal and informal, between states that are involved and have interests
		<i>Appoint a military representative to present as liaison</i>	Exchange of seconded military personnel as LO
	<i>Transparency Measures</i>	<i>Exchange of military</i>	Acknowledgment at military exercises;

		<i>information and intelligence</i>	intelligence exchange
		<i>Defense white paper; arms and forces registry; notification measures</i>	Common outline and perspective for defense publications
	<i>Consultation Measures</i>	<i>Use of neutral third-party mediators to help reduce tensions between parties involved</i>	The willingness of the parties involved in the conflict to remain neutral and free from acts of provocation
		<i>Joint commission</i>	ARF; ADMM; ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting
	<i>Goodwill Measures</i>	<i>Visit; cross-training;</i>	Trust building between states in the region
		<i>Policy of non-interference in internal affairs</i>	Code of Conduct
	<i>Constraint Measures</i>	<i>Non-aggression agreement; troop reduction agreement</i>	Joint military inspections or with a third party through on-site inspection visits

			to factories & military bases
		<i>Rules of engagement; no first-strike declaration; troop reduction</i>	Code of conduct; Disarmament and demilitarization agreements

Source: Baviera in Holly Higgins, Applying Confidence Building Measures in a Regional Context, Institute for Science and International Security (Higgins, 1991)

The research focuses on the CBM implemented by ASEAN, which aims to promote constructive discussion and consultation regarding political and security matters that are of shared interest and concern. It has played a crucial role in building confidence and preventive diplomacy in the region. With the emergence of AUKUS there are many sensitive issues that must be faced, so it is important for Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to find the proper strategies to increase cooperation, including in security and defense reconciliation. With ASEAN's centrality as its core identity, confidence-building measures will provide room for reconciliation between states that have interests in the Southeast Asia region.

2.1.4 Regional Security Complex

According to Barry Buzan, the Regional Security Complex is a regional security theory that enables a state to analyze and explain the development of states in a particular region. The Regional Security Complex emerged as a new concept for the structure of international security, as a dimension that connects the pattern of life between countries in international relations before the Cold War, during the Cold War, and after the Cold War. The Regional Security Complex provides different and diverse views, but it has a significant theoretical impact (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

In a Regional Security Complex, problems related to the security of the states involved are closely interrelated. This means that problems related to national security cannot exist without taking into account regional security. However, even though there is interdependence between states in a region, it does not necessarily mean that harmonious conditions will be achieved. Relations between states in the region are always influenced by various factors, such as the balance of power, alliances with other states, and the entry of external forces into the region (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is defined as how a state seeks to create regional order and security by cooperating with its neighboring states in the region. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever formulated two essential constituent variables of the Regional Security Complex theory, namely:

1. This internal variable can be measured using several indicators, namely:
 - a) Geographical location
The focus is to see how significant the role of geographic location is in defining a state as a region. This is because not all states located close together can establish a joint security arrangement.
 - b) Interaction between states
The interaction between states determines how often and how closely states in a region relate to each other. The focus is to see whether the interaction between states is deep enough to make them feel like one unit or too little interaction, making them perceive that they do not know their neighboring states.
 - c) Similarity of systems
The similarity of systems refers to the various cultural, economic, social, and political systems within states in one

region. The more these states have in common, the stronger the sense of solidarity can be.

2. External variables can be measured using two indicators, namely:

a) International situation

This indicator looks at the condition or situation of the international environment. It determines whether the international environment at that time supported the formation of a security arrangement in the Regional Security Complex (RSC) or not. For example, when the world was under the influence of the United States, this prompted Russia, China, and the countries in the Central Asian region to form a joint political and security arrangement to counter the domination of the United States.

b) Developing issues

This last indicator is related to developing issues that require the cooperation of regional countries, especially in terms of security arrangements. For example, the issue of terrorism required countries in one region to form a security arrangement. However, the issue that is currently developing may not necessarily affect the formation of security arrangements between regional countries.

Based on the explanation above, the security complex faced by Indonesia and the rest of the ASEAN member states is becoming more apparent and complicated. The existence of China as one of the major power states in the region and the involvement of the U.S. show that the internal and external variables of RSCs cannot be used as a single factor for level of analysis but can be combined. In the sense of the security sector, many states are linked and interconnected in facing the impact of AUKUS. Therefore, it is essential for this research to use the RSCT appropriately.

2.1.5 Strategy

The word "strategy" comes from the Greek word "strategos," and it came into use during the 18th century. In a narrow sense, it refers to the

"arts of the General" or the "art of managing" troops. B.H. Liddell Hart defines strategy as the art of distributing military means to fulfill the ends of policy. This definition suggests that strategy is the science and art of determining ends (goals), formulating ways (methods), and determining the infrastructure (means) used to achieve goals. Therefore, a strategy formulation must include objectives (goals), methods (ways), and resources (means) used (Hart & Henry, 1967).

According to Gen. US Army (Ret) Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Strategy covers what we should do (ends), how we should do it (ways), and what we should do it with (means)." Thus, the essence of strategy lies in the decision-making process regarding the primary elements of a strategy, including goals, methods, and resources (Goodpaster, 1981). Therefore, the formulation of a strategy must contain these three elements and must be balanced.

Mathematically, strategy is assumed as a way, means plus goals, with the formula:

ST = W + M + E. This means:

ST (Strategy) = Strategy,

W (Ways) = Ways taken to achieve the goal,

M (Means) = Resources, facilities and infrastructure that can be used in achieving goals, and

E (Ends) = Goals that have been specified in the policy.

2.1.6 Security Dilemma

After the end of the Cold War, the issue of security is still one of the focuses of attention that every state wants to achieve as a vital need. Security Dilemma is part of the concept of realism theory which is based on an assumption that the actions of a state to increase its military power can be contemplated as a threat to the security of other nations. This action to

increase the military capacity of a country can position the state as a state that can threaten other states or be in a position of being threatened at the same time (Ashari & Kurniawan, 2015).

Security dilemma conditions can arise where a state lives in an anarchic world condition and wants to meet its security needs through efforts to increase its national defense by not knowing the motives of other states. There is a balancing response by other parties when the state seeks to increase its defense and security and in the end, it will lead to an arms race (Perwita et al., 2013). The term "Security Dilemma" is used to describe the paradoxical situation where a state's attempts to strengthen its own security can have unintended consequences, causing a rise in insecurity for other states and potentially resulting in a cycle of escalating arms races and heightened tensions. Some indicators of the Security Dilemma include:

1. **Military Buildup:** The act of one state enhancing its military capacity or deploying new weaponry may be viewed as a threat by other states, prompting them to augment their own military capabilities. This phenomenon can lead to an escalating cycle of arms races and heightened tensions, which is commonly known as the Security Dilemma (Waltz, 1979).
2. **Alliance Formation:** When states form alliances for mutual defense or security purposes, this can create a sense of threat and insecurity for other states, leading them to form their own alliances or pursue their own security arrangements (J. J. Mearsheimer, 1994).
3. **Strategic Ambiguity:** If a state's military capabilities or intentions are uncertain or unclear, it can create an impression of potential threat to other states. As a result, they might respond by increasing their own military capabilities or taking other measures to defend themselves (Jervis, 1978).

4. Preemptive or Preventive Action: When a state perceives an imminent threat or danger, it may be inclined to take preemptive or preventive action to defend itself, which can lead to an escalation of tensions or conflict with other states (Snyder, 1984).
5. Fear and Mistrust: When states fear or mistrust each other, this can create a self-reinforcing cycle of suspicion and hostility, which can further escalate tensions and increase the risk of conflict (Jervis, 1976).

It is clear that a security dilemma is a condition in which efforts to advance national security have the effect of being seen as a threat to other states, thus provoking countermeasures, this situation arises primarily due to the prevailing circumstances and the surrounding conditions. Increasing the military capability of a state is a common thing for a state to do. The state purchases new weapons to add or upgrade defense equipment. In this case, the security dilemma does not mean an arms race because the fulfillment of defense capabilities in providing technology and weapons for the military is a must. This will continue to be done as long as the state exists. Thus, the security dilemma will always exist, especially if the security of the state needs to be guaranteed.

The state must protect, and defend its state and also has the right to do anything in realizing the stability of the state's security, it can be interpreted that a state increasing its security causes reactions from other states. So that every state that increases its military strength will tend to increase its military strength to establish a feeling of safety for the nation. But this will increase the potential for disputes that will use military force to be resolved (Jervis, 1978). The military modernization carried out by China and the formation of AUKUS initiated by America to fight against Chinese hegemony has made Southeast Asia region specifically ASEAN member states experience a security dilemma. The spread of the power and influence of China and America in the region should also further encourage

Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to strengthen ASEAN centrality and unity in the region and jointly improve security stability in the Southeast Asia region.

2.1.7 Cooperative Security

Cooperative security is usually described as a collaborative process in which states that share similar interests work together through agreed-upon means to decrease tension and distrust, alleviate or solve conflicts, foster trust, improve economic development possibilities, and maintain stability in their respective regions. Cooperative Security has been a commonly used term since the Cold War ended. It generally describes a peaceful approach to security by promoting international harmony and cooperation, although it may be considered idealistic. In the early 21st century, Cooperative Security has gained increased popularity among strategists and policymakers seeking to develop new security approaches to deal with the unpredictable and unstable nature of the present day. This approach to security must consider both internal and external factors, which include the idea of individual security and the active promotion and projection of stability in regions where instability and conflict could impact the security of cooperative security members (Cohen, 2001).

Image 2.2



Source: Cohen, 2001

Richard Cohen's concept of Cooperative Security can be defined as a model comprising of interconnected circles or rings. The model is based on a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions that share common values and cooperate in the areas of economics, politics, and defense in a practical and transparent manner. The system is designed to link the national security goals of each state through four security reinforcement rings:

1. **Ring One: Promoting and Protecting Human Rights.** The fundamental principle that underpins the Cooperative Security system is the shared conviction of its constituents to safeguard and preserve the safety and well-being of their respective citizens and comrades in the system. Here are some indicators that promoting and protecting human rights can contribute to achieving cooperative security:
 - a. **Reducing Conflict:** Respect for human rights can help to reduce tensions and conflicts between states. When individuals and groups feel that their rights are being respected, they are less likely to resort to violence and conflict (United Nations, 2015).
 - b. **Building Trust:** Collaborative efforts among states to safeguard and advance human rights can play a key role in nurturing trust and encouraging cooperation. This can create a foundation for more effective security cooperation in other areas (James, 2019).
 - c. **Strengthening Institutions:** Promoting and protecting human rights can help to strengthen institutions and promote the rule of law. This can lead to more effective governance, better protection for human rights, and greater stability ("Human Rights and Security," 1993).
 - d. **Countering Extremism:** Human rights violations can be a factor in fueling extremism and terrorism. By promoting

and protecting human rights, states can help to counter these threats and create a more secure environment (“Human Rights and Security,” 1993).

- e. Addressing Root Causes: Many security challenges are rooted in poverty, inequality, and human rights violations. By promoting and protecting human rights, countries can address the root causes of these challenges and create a more stable and secure environment (James, 2019).

2. **Ring Two: Peace Keeping.** The Cooperative Security Ring represents the fundamental idea of the Cooperative Security, which is to shield members from threats and hostilities posed by other members of the Cooperative Security. Additionally, the Cooperative Security includes collaborative efforts among members to combat shared threats such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, pollution, and coordinated planning and response in the face of natural or human-induced disasters. Here are some indicators that peacekeeping can contribute to achieving cooperative security:

- a. Preventing Conflict: Peacekeeping can help to prevent conflict by creating a buffer zone between opposing forces and promoting dialogue and negotiations between conflicting parties (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021).
- b. Protecting Civilians: Peacekeepers can provide protection for civilians who are at risk of violence or abuse, including women and children (Jackson, 2012).
- c. Supporting Political Transitions: Peacekeeping can support political transitions by providing security and stability during the transition period and helping to build institutions and governance structures (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2021).

- d. Promoting Reconciliation: Peacekeeping can promote reconciliation by bringing together conflicting parties and promoting dialogue and cooperation (International Peace Institute, 2018).
3. **Ring Three: Mutual Protection.** Cooperative Security includes a Collective Defense ring that offers dependable and trustworthy military defense against external threats or acts of aggression towards the Cooperative Security group. Here are some indicators that mutual protection can contribute to achieving cooperative security:
- a. Deterrence: Mutual protection can help to deter potential aggressors by demonstrating a collective capability to respond to threats and attacks (Serafimov, 2018).
 - b. Burden Sharing: Mutual protection can help to share the burden of providing security, particularly in areas where individual states may not have the resources or capabilities to do so alone (Lebovic, 2023).
 - c. Intelligence Sharing: Mutual protection can involve sharing intelligence and information about potential security threats, which can help to prevent attacks and identify those responsible (Reyes, 2021).
 - d. Joint Exercises: Mutual protection can involve joint military exercises and training, which can help to build trust and interoperability between different militaries (European Seminar, 2020).
 - e. Crisis Response: Mutual protection can help to facilitate a coordinated response to crises, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks (European Seminar, 2020).
4. **Ring Four: Actively Promotes Stability.** In the end, the main goal of a Cooperative Security framework is to avoid and anticipate instability in the neighboring area. Cooperative Security

accomplishes this by proactively encouraging stability through a range of strategies, which may include, in extreme cases, military action. This constitutes the outermost and most important ring of Cooperative Security. Here are some indicators that actively promoting stability can contribute to achieving cooperative security:

- a. Conflict Prevention: Actively promoting stability can help to prevent conflicts from arising by addressing underlying social, economic, and political factors that contribute to instability (United Nations, 2021).
- b. Development Assistance: Actively promoting stability can involve providing development assistance to states in need, which can help to reduce poverty and promote economic growth and stability (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2021).
- c. Diplomatic Engagement: Actively promoting stability can involve diplomatic engagement, including dialogue and negotiation, to help resolve conflicts and address regional security challenges (Cohen, 2001).
- d. Democracy and Human Rights: Actively promoting stability can involve promoting democracy and human rights, which can help to create stable and resilient societies (Nurfauzi et al., 2022).
- e. Capacity Building: Actively promoting stability can involve building the capacity of governments and civil society organizations to address security challenges and promote stability (Stepka, 2017).

The use of cooperative security in forming a security cooperation framework in the ASEAN region is needed to foster regional security stability. Security cooperation can be a forum for dialogue and consultation as well as an appropriate way to foster mutual trust between states that wish

to create international security in general or national security in particular. In the context of ASEAN, the concept of cooperative security can be seen in the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which has been effective in establishing trust among its members with regards to discussing security matters. The forum serves as a venue for member states to engage in dialogue and consultation on a range of security issues, both those that are traditional and those that are non-traditional in nature.

2.2 Previous Research

In this part, several previous studies have been attached that have relevance to the research and relevance in enriching the writing of this research. Although the phenomenon raised in this research is relatively new, especially in terms of perspective and possible strategies of Indonesia as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS. Here are some prior researchs that are pertinent to the research topic of this thesis:

1. Research entitled "Optimization of ASEAN Centrality In The Order to Face The Regional Security Issues Currently And In The Future" compiled by Nurliwedie Nurdin Kanan & Rira Nuradhawati in 2020.
2. Research entitled "Posisi Indonesia Terhadap Aliansi Amerika, Inggris dan Australia (AUKUS) Dalam Perspektif Neorealisme" compiled by Dyas Bintang Perdana, Rizaldi Dolly Ramasandi, and Maria Evangelina Setiawan in 2021.
3. Research entitled "Confidence Building Measures Between Indonesia and Australia as Defense Diplomacy Effort in Facing the Possible Security Impact of AUKUS in Indo-Pacific" compiled by Adelia Alviani in 2023.
4. Research entitled "A Strategic View of Minilateralism: Indonesia, QUAD, ASEAN, South Korea, Japan, and Impediment to ASEAN Centrality?" compiled by Hino Samuel Jose & Sigit Aris Prasetyo in 2021.

Table 2.2 Comparison Table of Previous Research

Researcher	Title	Method	Results	Difference	Similarity
Nurliwedie Nurdin Kanan & Rira Nuradhawati (2020)	Optimization of ASEAN Centrality In The Order to Face The Regional Security Issues Currently And In The Future	The chosen research method for this study involves conducting a literature review using qualitative techniques, data collection technique and writers are using descriptive analysis methods to describe the	Regional security is indeed very important for ASEAN, thus forming the ARF in collaboration with states within the Indo-Pacific region. This includes China and the US, which are major power states and have a strong influence on the sustainability of	The study is centered on examining Indonesia and ASEAN's contribution to addressing security concerns in the region by utilizing the ARF, a forum created by ASEAN for political and security discussions. It aims to promote shared viewpoints among	Discusses the challenges to ASEAN centrality, how to optimize ASEAN centrality in dealing with security issues in the region, and the development of regional cooperation in building ASEAN centrality in the region.

		available data and facts.	ARF, especially the US. Therefore, with the presence of major power states in the region, ARF must be able to determine attitudes and be precise in consolidating the interests of other ARF member states.	participating ARF member states to reduce threats to regional stability and security and maintain ASEAN's unity and centrality. The research intends to use this approach to optimize the ARF's effectiveness.	
Dyas Bintang Perdana, Rizaldi Dolly Ramasandi, and	Posis Indonesia Terhadap Aliansi Amerika, Inggris dan	This research uses a qualitative method with a	Understanding Indonesia's position and perspective is	This study utilizes the social network (SN) approach as the theoretical	This study examines the extent to which Indonesia can

Maria Evangelina Setiawan (2021)	Australia (AUKUS) Dalam Perspektif Neorealisme	literature study data collection technique.	important in various aspects, such as advancing the agenda and hosting meetings that bring together key players in the region for multilateral processes. However, the significance of Indonesia's foreign policy lies in its ability to strengthen its influence and shape the	foundation to analyze the conceptual foundations. The SN approach suggests that Indonesia's position in East Asian regionalism is established through its strong and interconnected relationships with other actors within the network of institutions. This research asserts that Indonesia's structural position	maintain its free and active foreign policy in influencing the development in Southeast Asia & beyond and examines how its achieved and how it can be maintained.
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
			regional environment and order. Leadership comes with influence, and to make its leadership effective, Indonesia must work harder to enhance its organizational capacity.	within the networks it has formed, and those it has connections with, explains its role in Asian regionalism, despite its limited material power.	
Adelia Alviani (2023)	Confidence Building Measures Between Indonesia and Australia as	This study employs qualitative descriptive methods and analyzes the	It is evident that the Indo-Pacific region's geopolitical dynamics are continuously	The research is limited to examining the impact of AUKUS and the responses of Indonesia and	This research examines the impact of AUKUS and the responses of Indonesia and organizations in the

	Defense Diplomacy Effort in Facing the Possible Security Impact of AUKUS in Indo-Pacific	research data through the lenses of both the Regional Security Complex Theory and the Offense- Defense Theory.	generating tension because of external competition. As a non-aligned nation and advocate of independent foreign policy, Indonesia is expected to reevaluate its principles and demonstrate determination in leading collective security with a strong voice together with	organizations in the region, while in this research the researcher examines more specifically the impact of AUKUS on Indonesia- Australia relationship and the defense diplomacy for CBM acts that have been or can be carried out by the two states.	region to Australia's steps aimed to reduce the strengthening of China's growing influence and military power.
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			other ASEAN nations.		
Hino Samuel Jose & Sigit Aris Prasetyo (2021)	A Strategic View of Minilateralism: Indonesia, QUAD, ASEAN, South Korea, Japan, and Impediment to ASEAN Centrality?	This research employs qualitative analysis and reviews past studies to answer the research question.	The centrality of ASEAN is not entirely impeded by external minilateralism, such as the Quad. Instead, it can be utilized to strengthen positive relationships and indirectly constrain China by utilizing other actors as proxies for ASEAN. External	This research is different in terms of its research focus. While the previous research focused on the QUAD security dialogue and other strategic collaborations with South Korea and Japan, this research focuses on the AUKUS Defense Pact and how Indonesia defense diplomacy as ASEAN	This study explores ways in which ASEAN could enhance its role and strategic perspective in order to ensure the centrality of ASEAN-led initiatives.

			cooperation of ASEAN should be harmonized in political and economic domains to foster a prosperous Indo-Pacific region with a greater emphasis on ideas and an outward-looking mindset beyond pure commercial diplomacy.	chairmanship 2023 can maintain its centrality in the Indo-Pacific.	
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2.3 Conceptual Framework



The US views China as a strategic competitor and seeks to counterbalance its growing military and economic power in the region. Thus, the US initiated AUKUS as a response to what it sees as the growing security challenges posed by China in the region. AUKUS could lead to a fragmentation of the regional security architecture and weaken ASEAN's role as a central actor in regional security issues. Therefore, as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023, Indonesia must ensure the implementation of ASEAN centrality through defense diplomacy for CBMs. It is expected to have the output of with Indonesia's perspective and strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 can ensure and asser ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS. With those outputs, it will lead to the stability of ASEAN regional security.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Methods and Design

This research methodology is quasi-qualitative, where the use of theory is still possible as a research tool, from finding problems and collecting data to analyzing data (Rahmat, 2009). The form of research according to the level of analysis is descriptive research. Descriptive research is designed to gather information about current real conditions. The aim is to describe the nature of a situation that was taking place at the time the research was conducted and to examine the causes of certain symptoms (Sugiyono, 2014). The results obtained are representative data, to take further actions and strategies.

The explanation and description in this research will be developed through a case study approach. The case study approach is a qualitative approach that aims to develop and explore a more in-depth understanding of a case to be illustrated specifically through the collection of complete data sources from various information, including interviews, audio, and visual materials as well as various forms of documents and reports (Creswell, 2017). The decision of this case study approach will provide an advantage for this research to explore the problems that exist in a case because of its characters which develop description and analysis.

The research method used is included in the evaluation research. Assessment research aims to provide information (useful feedback) for strategy determination (Prabowo, 2019). The results of evaluation research can be used to improve or enhance a strategy or policy. This method can be used to see whether an activity has or has not achieved the goals set previously. In general, the methods used to answer the research objectives are described in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1
Research Method

No.	<u>Research Objectives:</u>	Method
1.	Analysing the Perspective of Indonesia as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS.	Literature study, focused and in-depth interviews with experts and regulators from the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2.	Analysing Indonesia's possible strategize as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS.	Literature study using the theoretical analysis method, followed by directed and in-depth interviews with experts and regulators from the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then conducting an assessment to find the proper strategy using the SWOT analysis method.

Source: The Researcher, 2023

3.2 Research Location and Time

This research is done online and offline. Literature, official documents, and report are being conducted and collected via online libraries or official websites meanwhile the researcher also conducted an

interview with the source persons offline. The data from the interview are collected from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ministry of the Defense Republic of Indonesia, and also from academicians and think-tank bodies.

Table 3.2
Research Time Table

No	Activity	2022-2023					
		October	November	December	January	February	March
1.	Preparation and Thesis Proposal Seminar	1-31	1-30				
2.	Thesis Proposal Revision			1-15			
3.	Data Collection and processing			16-31	1-15		
4.	Research Result Seminar and Thesis Defense Preparation				16-30	1-31	
5.	Thesis Defense and Thesis Revision						1-30

3.3 Research Subject and Object

3.3.1 Research Subject

The research subjects are the individuals or entities that will be impacted by the conclusions drawn from the research findings. They represent the entire object of study, and there may be multiple sources or informants who can provide relevant information about the research problem. In qualitative research, these subjects are often referred to as informants, who are individuals that the author trusts to provide reliable information to supplement the research data (Anggiani, 2017). This is also explained by Sugiyono in his book *Quantitative, Qualitative, and R&D Research Methods* stated:

“Informant is a term for samples from qualitative research. Samples in qualitative research are not called respondents, but as resource persons, or participants, informants, and teachers in the research.”

Based on those qualifications, the author has selected several possible informants to obtain actual data regarding this research, as follow:

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia:
 - Director for ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation, Roliansyah Soemirat.
2. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia:
 - Directorate of Defense Strategy Policy
 - Directorate of Defense International Cooperation

3.3.2 Research Object

As quoted from Indonesia Defense University thesis guidelines, it is stated that the research object is the problem or issue under study which becomes the point of attention in the study. The research object is also defined as the nature of the state (attribute) of an object, person, or situation which is the centre of attention or research target. The object of this

research is the perspective and possible strategies of Indonesia as the Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding the emergence of AUKUS. The author is trying to explore and explain Indonesia's perspective and possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023, especially in defense diplomacy effort in responding to AUKUS where many parties are concerned about what impact could AUKUS possibly bring to the region. This study will also use the role of ASEAN centrality as the object as it is one of the most important factors in conducting defense diplomacy.

3.4 Data Collection Techniques

In research that is quasi-qualitative in nature, the quality and comprehensiveness of the data collected play a critical role in determining the quality of the research. Researchers must consider the "what," "who," "where," "when," and "how" when collecting data. Quasi qualitative research typically employs observation, documentation/record-keeping, and interviews as data collection techniques. It is feasible to gather information from non-human sources, such as documents and existing records. The use of this data collection technique also entails other supplementary activities, such as selecting informants and documenting the data/information obtained from data collection (Iryana & Kawasati, 2019). Based on the previous qualitative data collection techniques, combined with all the research problems and research questions, the author has decided to collect research data by using the interview and literature study as secondary techniques to obtain actual and factual research data. Interviews and literature studies will be combined so that the authors will get a clearer explanation of the research problem.

3.4.1 Interview

Interviews are one of the most common techniques for collecting qualitative research data. An interview is a method of gathering information where the researcher poses questions to an interviewee and receives

answers in response. The information exchange in this technique is unidirectional, with the interviewer asking questions and the interviewee providing answers (Fathoni, 2006). Interviews allow researchers to collect diverse data from informants in various situations and contexts (Sarosa, 2017). Meanwhile, according to Stewart and Cash (Simbolon, 2019), the interview is defined as an interaction in which there is an exchange or sharing of rules, responsibilities, feelings, beliefs, motives, and information. Interviews aim to obtain knowledge that is understood by the informants related to the topic under research.

During the data collection phase of this research, the study used a structured interview method. Structured interviews are questions that lead to answers in the pattern of questions raised (Gulo, 2002). The interviewer will prepare complete and detailed questions regarding Indonesia's perspective and possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding the emergence of AUKUS to assert the role of ASEAN centrality. The interview guideline that has been prepared can still be developed along with the interview process. This method is used to obtain information and views on the condition of security stability of the region after the establishment of AUKUS and how Indonesia's role as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert the role of ASEAN centrality.

3.4.2 Literature Study

The author of this research also employed the literature review approach to gather data. This method involves analyzing and studying theories from different literature sources relevant to the research topic. Using this technique, data for the study is gathered from books, printed materials, and credible online articles that are academically acceptable (Kuncoro, 2012). Zed has identified four stages of literature study, which include gathering the required materials, creating a working bibliography, planning time effectively, and thoroughly reading and documenting the research materials (Fadli, 2021).

The steps that must be taken by the author in the literature study method are as follows (Zed, 2018):

- a. Collect research materials. As the literature study method is also used in this research, the gathered material consists of information or empirical data derived from various sources such as books, journals, official and scientific research reports, and other relevant literature related to this study.
- b. Read library materials. Reading activities for research purposes is not a passive job. The author is asked not to simply absorb all the "knowledge" in reading material, but rather a screening activity that requires active and critical reader involvement to obtain seamless results. To thoroughly examine research materials, the author must explore library resources to uncover novel concepts relevant to the research.
- c. Make research notes. The activity of documenting research materials is can be said as the most important stage of the whole steps of the literature study method. As a result, all the material that has been read should be synthesized into a final report or conclusion.
- d. Analyzing research notes. After reading all the materials, they are analyzed and processed to arrive at a conclusion that is presented in the form of a research report.

3.5 Data Validity Testing

The concept of data validity holds significant importance in research that is useful for updating the concept of validity and the concept of reliability. Following the characteristics of qualitative research which is the research method used, some criteria must be met to ensure the validity of the data that has been researched, therefore, in order to ascertain the validity of the data, it is crucial to scrutinize the data. The author of this

research employed the triangulation method to ensure the validity of the data.

The triangulation method is a technique used to ensure the validity of data, which involves using additional sources of data to cross-check or validate the initial data. This method is particularly useful in mitigating differences in the reality of the phenomenon being studied and in collecting data from various perspectives. In other words, with the triangulation method, the author can recheck their findings by comparing them with various sources, methods, or theories (Moloeng, 2018).

The triangulation method in proving credibility is defined as checking data from various sources, methods, and times. Thus there is source triangulation, technical triangulation, and time triangulation (Sugiyono, 2014).

1. Source Triangulation

To ensure the credibility of the data, source triangulation is performed by verifying the information gathered from multiple sources.

2. Triangulation Technique

The validity of the data can also be tested using triangulation techniques, which involve checking the same data obtained from a single source using different methods.

3. Time Triangulation

Credibility check by interview, or other techniques in different times and situations.

3.6 Data Analysis Techniques

The data analysis technique is steps of activities to process data that has been collected into a set of results, both in the form of discoveries and in the form of the truth of a hypothesis (Hasyim, 1982). This theory is explained by Miles and Huberman in the book *Qualitative Research Methodology Data Analysis*, the data analysis technique formulated by Miles and Huberman is described as follows (Miles & Huberman, 1987):




Figure 3.1 Components of Qualitative Data Analysis Model

Source: Miles & Huberman, 1987

1. Data Collection

Data collection is overall data taken to select data into parts and then sort out which data will be taken to be used as material for ongoing research. Data collection is data obtained from interviews and literature studies.

2. Data Condensation

The process of data condensation involves selecting, simplifying, abstracting, focusing, and transforming the raw data that has been collected. Data condensation is a form of analysis to sharpen, select, focus, discard, and organize data to obtain final conclusions.

3. Data Display

The display of the data in this research is a systematic preparation activity to obtain conclusions and research results. The display of the data taken is from words, sentences, text, and so on, from the data, conclusions can be generated.

4. Conclusion/Verification

In the data analysis process carried out by the author, the next process is composing the conclusions and results from those data. The conclusion composing step is an inseparable part of the analysis process.

3.7 SWOT Analysis

SWOT analysis is a structured process of identifying different factors that can help in developing a plan of action. The rationale behind this analysis is to capitalize on Strengths and Opportunities while simultaneously minimizing Weaknesses and Threats. Strengths and Weaknesses are Internal Strategic Factors (IFAS) that come from within a company, organization or even a country, while Opportunities and Threats are Strategic External Factors (EFAS) that come from outside (Rangkuti, 2015).

This analysis was conducted using the interview guide and documentation studies as data collection tools, following the steps based on the SWOT concept described earlier. With the following steps:

- a) Classify the data obtained for processing;
- b) Conduct a SWOT analysis;
- c) Enter into the SWOT matrix (EFAS and IFAS);

- d) Analyze SWOT strategies and matrices; and
- e) Recommend the strategy that has been made to the relevant agencies.

Then in developing a strategy using SWOT analysis, some factors influence the components of the SWOT analysis. These factors come from internal and external as previously mentioned. The explanation is as follows:

a) Internal Factors

Internal factors are factors that come from within the organization/company or even the country where there are two components, namely strengths, and weaknesses. Both of these components have an impact on the better of a study if the strengths are greater than the weaknesses. So, if this internal strength is maximized, it will provide much better research results. The following are internal factors that influence the SWOT analysis, including:

- 1) Human resources (HR) and resources availability owned by an organization, company, or state;
- 2) Budget owned;
- 3) Political stability;
- 4) Economic Growth and Technological Development;
- 5) Strengths or weaknesses possessed;
- 6) Experience that has previously been experienced by the organization or state success or failure.

b) External Factors

These external factors consist of opportunities and threats. External factors that influence the SWOT analysis include the following:

- 1) Social culture, politics, ideology, and economy of a country;
- 2) International geopolitics; and
- 3) Development of global technology.

These strategic factors are then arranged in a SWOT Matrix consisting of an internal factor analysis summary (IFAS) and an external

factor analysis summary (EFAS) matrix, where IFAS covers strengths and weaknesses and EFAS covers opportunities and challenges. The SWOT matrix is described as follows

Table 3.3
Matrix SWOT

IFAS/ EFAS	STRENGTH (S)	WEAKNESS (W)
OPPORTUNITIES (O)	SO strategy (a strategy that capitalizes on strengths and takes advantage of opportunities)	WO Strategy (Strategy that minimizes weaknesses and takes advantage of opportunities)
THREAT (T)	ST Strategy (Strategy that uses strengths and overcomes threats)	WT Strategy (Strategy that minimizes weaknesses and avoids threats)

Alternative strategies are the result of a SWOT analysis matrix that produces SO, WO, ST, and WT strategies. Alternative strategies produced at least 4 strategies as a result of the SWOT matrix analysis. The resulting strategies are as follows (Rangkuti, 2015):

1. SO Strategy
This strategy is based on the mindset of utilizing all strengths to seize and take advantage of maximum opportunities.
2. ST Strategy
This strategy is a strategy of using strengths to overcome threats.
3. WO Strategy
This strategy is implemented based on the utilization of existing opportunities by minimizing existing weaknesses.
4. WT Strategy

This strategy is based on minimizing existing weaknesses and avoiding threats.

To determine the results in the form of an ideal acquisition strategy and/or system this research also used data analysis techniques through the SWOT method with a qualitative approach consisting of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. SWOT analysis aims to maximize strengths and opportunities, but can minimize weaknesses and threats. The SWOT analysis uses a summary matrix of internal factor analysis (IFAS) and a summary matrix of external factor analysis (EFAS), where IFAS includes strengths and weaknesses and EFAS includes opportunities and challenges.

3.7.1 Weight Giving

Each IFAS and EFAS factor is given a weight value ranging from 0.0 (least important to an organization or company) to 1.0 (most important to an organization or company). IFAS and EFAS weighting is done separately, with the sum of each not exceeding 1.0.

3.7.2 Giving Ratings

Ratings are based on the impact of these factors on the state of the organization or business (or their impact on the sustainability of work programs). Rating scales for strengths and opportunities factors range from 1 (least impact) to 4 (highest impact). However, the weaknesses and threats are assessed in reverse, ranging from 4 (least impact) to 1 (biggest impact). It is permissible to assign the same value to two or more factors and is not limited to the total number.

a. Calculation of IFAS and EFAS Scores

After the weights and ratings are determined, the weights and ratings for each factor are multiplied and summed separately between IFAS and EFAS to determine the score for each factor group.

b. Determination of Strategies that can be Applied

If the IFAS and EFAS scores are greater than 2, then the SO strategy is chosen. If the IFAS score is less than or equal to 2 and the EFAS score is greater than 2, the WO strategy is chosen. If the IFAS score is greater than 2 and the EFAS score is less than or equal to 2, the ST strategy is selected. If the IFAS and EFAS values are less than or equal to 2 then the WT strategy is chosen.

CHAPTER 4

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

4.1 General Overview of Research Object

4.1.1 The Dynamics of the ASEAN Region after the Emergence of AUKUS

ASEAN has a significant role in the Indo-Pacific concept, because of its strategic location right in the middle of the Indo-Pacific, between the Indian and Pacific oceans, so it is the main key to the concept of this region (Dingding, 2018). It can be said for this geographical reason that gives ASEAN a role to contribute by maintaining regional stability, achieving regional security, peace, and stability through the use of a strong framework of cooperation and commitment among its members and partners outside ASEAN (Direktorat Jenderal Kerja Sama ASEAN Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2010). Today, however, ASEAN is at an important crossroads. The widely accepted concept of ASEAN Centrality emphasizes that ASEAN must be the dominant regional platform for addressing common challenges and engaging with external powers (Parks et al., 2018). However, increasing geopolitical rivalries are placing new pressure on ASEAN Centrality, and political and security cooperation is becoming increasingly imperative. Recent developments in the region show that ASEAN's efforts to establish regional security stability are being tested.

ASEAN has played a central role in maintaining peace and security in the region for the last 50 years. ASEAN has become the main channel for its member states to jointly address common challenges and manage disputes among ASEAN member states. ASEAN is described as the fulcrum on which the Indo-Pacific security, political and economic architecture will be built (Pitsuwan, 2017). ASEAN has also become a forum for developing states in the region to improve their negotiating position with the major power states. ASEAN has succeeded in creating a platform for dialogue with

major powers, and through its community-building process, contributed to regional peace and stability (ASEAN, 2011).

In recent with the formation of AUKUS, ASEAN's challenge to its centrality is getting tougher. With tensions escalating between China and the US, ASEAN member states are responding in varied ways, complicating efforts to reach a consensus on the region's geopolitical issues. It is feared that the rivalry between the two major power states from geopolitical rivalries is undermining ASEAN's ability to influence regional diplomacy and control its destiny. ASEAN Centrality is a concept that aims to build a regional system centered on ASEAN rather than based on a Chinese or US perspective. The implementation of ASEAN centrality, instead of seeing the region as a geography of geopolitical competition and a zero-sum game; It adopts an approach with ASEAN at its centre, where has cooperation rather than competition and development and prosperity are seen as unifying elements. For this reason, initiatives such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) have been implemented for multifaceted and inclusive dialogue efforts within ASEAN (Cem, 2021).

The initiatives carried out in asserting the centrality of ASEAN, offer member states space to maneuver to avoid the choice between the US and China to avoid the risk of conflict. ASEAN member states on the one hand want to attract Chinese investment and infrastructure projects to their state. Southeast Asia, which is very important for energy connectivity, trade, and transportation, is a region that is passed by one of the 6 main routes of the BRI Project. For this reason, ASEAN member states are popular destinations for investment and support from China. On the other hand, the US tends to improve its relations with states in the region within the scope of the Indo-Pacific policy. Especially in the context of China's supply chain

diversification, ASEAN states have great potential for the United States (Asia Nikkei, 2021).

The procurement of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia in the AUKUS agreement is seen to further heat up China's conflict with the US and its allies and to re-present a cold war atmosphere by modernizing nuclear weapons from both sides. Thus, the Southeast Asian region is have a potential to be no longer a nuclear-free area as stipulated in the 1995 SEANWFZ (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) Treaty which establishes a joint commitment of ASEAN member states to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction-free zone (Kuswardini, 2018). The Southeast Asian region will be affected by the presence of AUKUS and the prolonged conflict between China and the United States and their allies. AUKUS signifies the presence of a strong military alliance in the region. Even though this defense cooperation is claimed to aim to enhance a developing partnership network in the region including with ASEAN, referring to geopolitical developments in the region over the past few years, it is clear that AUKUS contains geopolitical interests of the US (Wene, 2021).

4.1.2 Indonesia as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Asserting The Role of ASEAN's Centrality.

AUKUS with the interests of the US, UK, and Australia behind it does not only have an impact on China or the Indo-Pacific region as a whole but geopolitically and geostrategically brings profound impacts for the Southeast Asian region. This is of course related to the security of Southeast Asia because AUKUS will be in direct contact with the Southeast Asian region in its preventive efforts, namely to stem the expansion of China's influence in the region. As a region that is in the midst of tension between the two major power states, it certainly raises concerns for states in the Southeast Asian region (Strangio, 2021). The result of the varied stances of ASEAN member states in responding to AUKUS explicitly will

have an impact on the ASEAN status quo. ASEAN's economic dependence on China makes ASEAN member states only have a few resources and bargaining power apart from having to maintain good relations with China. ASEAN's ineffectiveness in overcoming China's economic dependence and military aggressiveness further confirms the view of the US and its allies that ASEAN does not yet have the ability to overcome China's aggressiveness. Therefore, the developing economic and military competition in the region will make ASEAN's centrality even more marginalized if it is unable to provide a firm stance against AUKUS and tensions between the two major power states (Wene, 2021).

Responding to real and anticipated threats to the regional security architecture, Indonesia — ASEAN's natural leader and the cradle of the Non-Aligned Movement — has pushed for ASEAN's definition of the Indo-Pacific. The aim is for ASEAN to play a critical role in shaping the contours of an emerging regional security architecture that shares its core values. In recent years, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has advocated for an alternative conception, one that is “open, transparent and inclusive” and supports “the habit of dialogue, promoting cooperation and friendship, and upholds international law” (Anyu, 2018). It builds on the efforts of his dynamic predecessor, Marty Natalegawa, who devoted significant diplomatic efforts to promoting ASEAN centrality in the last decade (Chandran, 2018). Indonesia's efforts achieved realization at the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in June 2019, when Southeast Asian countries adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, 2019).

The AOIP states ASEAN will “continue to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions” and serve as an “honest broker within the strategic environment of competing interests.” The AOIP emphasizes ASEAN's commitment to an “open,” “transparent,” “inclusive,” and “rules-based” order anchored by

“respect for international law” (Hoang, 2019). The AOIP reaffirms ASEAN’s long-held post-Cold War aspiration to “lead the shaping of their economic and security architecture and ensure that such dynamics will continue to bring about peace, security, stability, and prosperity for the peoples in Southeast Asia as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions or the Indo-Pacific.” The AOIP also underlines ASEAN’s pacifist values and reinforce on conflict prevention and management through “avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game” (Heydarian, 2021).

AOIP is ASEAN's effort to keep the rivalling major power states from clashing, while still benefiting regional development. This is indeed an ideal vision but its realization is very difficult in the current situation where China's assertive steps are being challenged by the steady presence of the US and its allies through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). For ASEAN, AOIP means implementing strategic autonomy, for other states, it could mean compromising the regional architecture that FOIP aspires to. Furthermore, Australia cannot be too free in expressing its interests as it is not "truly included" in regional mechanisms, only acting as an observer and dialogue partner (Adamy, 2022). ASEAN centrality is urgently needed amidst the dynamics of geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the region. AOIP opens dialogue and cooperation with all states without exception. AOIP puts forward an open and inclusive approach to dialogue and cooperation in areas that are ASEAN priorities. AOIP also prioritizes synergy amidst differences in the concept of the Indo-Pacific and is aimed at strengthening existing mechanisms in dealing with regional and global challenges.

Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN this year as well as being the largest state in ASEAN certainly has a significant role in achieving the formulation of resolutions and joint agreements on issues that occur in the region, including the response to AUKUS. Indonesia needs to play a role in building and maintaining ASEAN's collective attitude because Indonesia's

geopolitical and geostrategic position is the most reckoned state among ASEAN member states in maintaining security stability in the region. It is a challenge for ASEAN to continue to have an active role amid the escalating tensions that occurred between AUKUS and China, which at any time could lead to military conflict and even nuclear war in the region. However, the tension between AUKUS and China's powers also provides a great opportunity for ASEAN by prioritizing ASEAN Centrality which plays a role in balancing the major power states. Because the impact of tensions if they become open conflicts will eventually be felt by all ASEAN member states in the region. Hence that a central and united ASEAN is the best way to reduce the tension that is currently happening.

4.2 Data Collection Result

The emergence of AUKUS is a crucial issue for Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023, bearing in mind the principle of ASEAN centrality that stated in Article 1.15 of ASEAN Charter, where ASEAN is a center in decision-making and the future of the region. China's aggressiveness towards ASEAN member states has disrupted the balance of power in this region. In addition, the proliferation of non-ASEAN-centric cooperation, such as QUAD is a concern for ASEAN. With the emergence of AUKUS, partnerships that are not ASEAN-centric in the region are added to be seen as a geopolitical challenge to Indonesia's chairmanship this year. AUKUS will bring Southeast Asia region into a security dilemma where the procurement of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia will bring about a new chapter in the arms race in the region. Indonesia as natural leader of ASEAN and the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 must continue to play a central role in shaping the regional architecture while deepening engagement with external parties and contributing collectively to regional peace, security, and stability.

ASEAN region as the center of Indo-Pacific geographically and geopolitically will have a few significant impacts after the emergence of

AUKUS. Research related to the perspective and possible strategies for Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS are aimed at mapping potential threats and opportunities for Indonesia in asserting ASEAN centrality and maintaining regional security stability. This research was carried out by interviewing government officials from the Directorate of International Cooperation and the Directorate of Defense Strategy Policy, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Director of ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

The researcher gives a code to each informant so that the presentation and processing of the data can be read and understood easily, along with the coding that the researcher made;

Table 4.1.
List of Informants

NO	POSITION	INFORMANTS	CODE
1	Middle Policy Analyst for CB, CBM & Preventive Diplomacy, Directorate of International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense of The Republic of Indonesia	Colonel Imam S. Cahyono, S.S., M.Sc	I1
2	Head of the Sub-Directorate of National Defense Policy Formulation and Implementation, Directorate of Defense Strategy Policy, Ministry	Marine Colonel DR. Steven T. Sambouw, S.H., S.KEP., M.H., M.AP.	I2

	of Defense of The Republic of Indonesia		
3	Director of ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia	Rolliansyah Soemirat	I3

Source: The Researcher, 2023

4.2.1 The Perspective and Indonesia's Possible Strategies as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert The Role of ASEAN Centrality

To answer the problem formulations, the researcher made questions aimed at relevant sources who were considered capable of answering questions and questionnaires. Furthermore, the researcher gave a code to each question to make it easier to describe and process the data. The following is a list of questions that the researcher has made;

Table 4.2
List of Questions

NO	QUESTIONS	CODE
1	With the existence of AUKUS, what impact might this have on the Indo-Pacific Region, more specifically, what impact will AUKUS have on ASEAN's centrality in the Indo-Pacific in the current very volatile, uncertain, and ever-changing geopolitical situation?	Q1
2	Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 with AUKUS will face challenges because ASEAN member states have given various responses to the emergence of AUKUS, what	Q2

	role or steps should Indonesia take for ASEAN in responding to AUKUS?	
3	Many opinions from observers say that AUKUS was formed to counter China's increasing hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region, do you agree with that opinion?	Q3
4	Considering the geographical location there is a possibility that the submarine will patrol through the territorial seas of Indonesia and other ASEAN countries and violate the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, what should be the strategy/response of ASEAN diplomacy?	Q4
5	The competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific has the potential to threaten ASEAN to become a marginal group in its region. In 2023 Indonesia will again become Chairmanship of ASEAN for the fourth time, what kind of initiatives should Indonesia undertake to reaffirm ASEAN's centrality?	Q5
6	What kind of defense diplomacy strategies should be made to build and re-increase the sense of unity and trust between ASEAN member states so that ASEAN's centrality can be further asserted?	Q6
7	What kind of defense diplomacy strategies are ideally carried out by ASEAN as an organization in preventing potential conflicts caused by AUKUS because there are indications that there will be an escalation of the South China Sea dispute and an increase in the potential for an	Q7

	arms race in the Indo-Pacific so that it will have an impact, especially on ASEAN member states that are geographically in the vortex of conflict?	
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Source: The Researcher, 2023

Moreover, the researcher combines and presents raw data from interviews with three informants from different positions;

Table 4.3
List of Responses

No Question	Response From Each Source Person		
	I1	I2	I3
Q1	China's aggressiveness in the region became the background for the formation of AUKUS by the US which then based on the agreement the US and UK will provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Meanwhile, in the ASEAN region itself, there is the SEANWFZ Treaty as a commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian	When viewed from a geopolitical point of view, the formation of AUKUS is a strong signal, that in addition to the emergence of projections of military power in the region, its escalation also leads to the development of forces, especially the nuclear arms race. This is a form of security dilemma with the Indo-Pacific region as a	The first impact of the emergence of AUKUS is as stated in the Indonesian press release, that Indonesia is deeply concerned about the possibility of possession of nuclear-powered submarines by Australia, which can be said to be a statement from ASEAN as well but unfortunately not issued on behalf of ASEAN.

	region as a region free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Indonesia was the first state to respond and show deep concern about the emergence of AUKUS. If it is based on the theory of realism that states act to maximize their power, then with the emergence of AUKUS there will be perceptions from other states in the region that see this as a threat. Regarding this matter, Australia in several bilateral forums between Australia and ASEAN member states stated that AUKUS aims to maintain the	driving force. It cannot be denied that the international system is anarchic. Each state will feel safe if it has military strength in balance with the surrounding states as well as Australia. So based on this theory logically a security dilemma will emerge. Another driving factor for the emergence of AUKUS is that the geopolitical epicentrum of the 21st century has indeed shifted to the Indo-Pacific.	Indonesia is very concerned about this because, the 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), clearly regulates which states are allowed to have nuclear weapons and which are not, as well as the obligations of states that have nuclear weapons and what forms of cooperation. For nuclear-powered submarines, it is indeed a "gray area" where the regulation is still unclear, but this "gray area" is being exploited in a direction that according to Indonesia is not acceptable. If Australia as a non-nuclear
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	stability of the security of the Indo-Pacific which according to the perception of AUKUS member states is not yet stable with China's increasing aggressive behavior.		weapon state has the nuclear-powered submarine capability, this could trigger other states to do the same thing including Indonesia, this is what Indonesia is concerned about. Secondly, the impact of the emergence of AUKUS is regarding dynamics in the region. Will AUKUS provide a conducive atmosphere in the region or even cause discomfort among states in the region. Especially in this case with the emergence of AUKUS, states in the region will be
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			faced with a situation where there is a major power state that may feel disturbed by the emergence of AUKUS. So there is a possibility that this major power state will take action to respond to the emergence of AUKUS in the region. States in the region hope that the emergence of AUKUS will not harm the dynamic situation in the region, considering that geographically ASEAN is the center of the Indo-Pacific region. Due to the rivalry of the two major states
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			which are competing for hegemony in the region, Southeast Asia is a proxy for this rivalry which can be said to result in disruption for states in the region.
Q2	To assert ASEAN's centrality, forums are needed to discuss what steps are appropriate for ASEAN member states. This year, where Indonesia is the chairmanship of ASEAN with the theme "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth", Indonesia invites ASEAN member states to avoid divisions as much as possible through ASEAN dialogue forums.	Indonesia as Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 is committed to building a stronger ASEAN, capable of facing increasingly complex future challenges, able to protect the region from external shocks, and able to maintain ASEAN's centrality amid major power states rivalry. Considering geographically ASEAN's position is in the middle of the Indo-Pacific	Indonesia clearly stated its position through a press release issued a few days after the appearance of AUKUS, which stated that Indonesia was watching with great caution the Australian Government's decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Indonesia does not have a problem with

	Indonesia through its chairmanship invites all ASEAN states to remain united and central, ASEAN must be the center of all activities in the region. With ASEAN's centrality being increasingly emphasized, it is hoped that hegemonies from outside ASEAN can be filtered and potential conflicts can be prevented through dialogue forums by ASEAN. In the field of defense itself, ASEAN has initiated a dialogue forum, namely ADMM Plus, so that states outside ASEAN with interests in the region can be accommodated	region, the main attitude that ASEAN should take in response to the emergence of AUKUS is to try to be impartial. In emphasizing the centrality of ASEAN, amid various issues related to regional interests, ASEAN must be the decision maker and other parties must follow.	alliances or cooperation between states, just as no state can prohibit Indonesia from cooperating with other states. However, if an alliance is judged to have a certain impact on the region, Indonesia will certainly be alert and aware. The problem is not about friendship alliances between AUKUS member states, but AUKUS has the potential to disrupt or have an impact on dynamics in the region.
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	through the ADMM Plus forum.		
Q3	While the alliance has not explicitly mentioned China as a target or adversary, I believe that the formation of AUKUS reflects concerns about China's growing military and economic influence in the region.	In addition to causing a security dilemma, the attitude of the US to initiate AUKUS can be said to be a balance of power to anticipate or deal with the forces of China that are considered threatening. There is concern and anxiety over China's domination which cannot be avoided by states in the region.	AUKUS is expected to have a significant impact on the Southeast Asia region, particularly in the context of the South China Sea dispute. While AUKUS is not specifically designed as a counterbalance to China, the alliance's focus on maritime security and technological cooperation in the region can indirectly serve as a counterbalance to China's growing military presence and assertiveness in the South China Sea.

Q4	Through dialogue forums initiated by ASEAN, it is hoped that there will be transparency and good communication between the parties so that potential conflicts can be prevented. Now that the issue of AUKUS can be said to have dropped off, it is assumed that Australia can convince ASEAN member states that nuclear-powered submarines can be used responsibly and ensure the security and stability of the region. ASEAN which has a central position both geographically and geopolitically where ASEAN member states are	It is necessary to form a joint consensus among member states that have different national interests and goals. Therefore, Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 needs to embrace all ASEAN members to strengthen regional cooperation and create fewer disputes and more unification of interests. ASEAN with its centrality must be able to collaborate with states that are currently competing in the region and even with all the parties in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, ASEAN can take a	ASEAN could adopt a multi-pronged approach that combines diplomatic engagement, legal remedies, and regional security cooperation to address any potential violations of the SEANWFZ by the AUKUS alliance's nuclear-powered submarines. ASEAN needs to remain vigilant and proactive in promoting regional peace and stability while upholding the principles of international law and the SEANWFZ.
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	the target of the interests of the major power states must be able to accommodate the various interests of the major power states. Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN this year will continue to prioritize its free-active politics, free means that Indonesia is free to cooperate with any state according to its interests and actively maintains security stability, and peace, particularly in Indonesia and the region in general.	measured stance against external political interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN countries. All states must be considered as ASEAN partners as long as these states are willing to comply with the principle of ASEAN centrality in the region.	
Q5	With a more central ASEAN, it is hoped that the influence from outside ASEAN can be minimized and	Indonesia can strengthen regional diplomacy and cooperation with ASEAN countries and other	Indonesia through ASEAN always emphasizes to external parties that if there are

	tensions in the region can be decreased through dialogue forums by ASEAN. Through dialogue forums initiated by ASEAN, it is hoped that there will be transparency and good communication between the parties so that potential conflicts can be prevented. Now that the issue of AUKUS can be said to have dropped off, it is assumed that Australia can convince ASEAN member states that nuclear-powered submarines can be used responsibly and ensure the security and stability of the region. ASEAN which has a central	neighbors to ensure stability and security in the region, as well as promote economic cooperation and sustainable development. Indonesia can promote dialogue and multilateral diplomacy to prevent potential conflicts in the region, and support dialogue with AUKUS to maintain peace and stability in the region.	interests in the region, then these external parties must adjust to ASEAN policies. It can be said that the purpose of procuring nuclear-powered submarines by AUKUS is not purely to maintain regional security. Until now, the appearance of AUKUS cannot be called as a threat, but it has the potential to disrupt regional stability and trigger an arms race in the region. Since 55 years of the founding of ASEAN, ASEAN has continued to work on creating a conducive region, so if there
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	position both geographically and geopolitically where ASEAN member states are the target of the interests of the major power states must be able to accommodate the various interests of the major power states. Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN this year will continue to prioritize its free-active politics, free means that Indonesia is free to cooperate with any state according to its interests and actively maintains security stability, and peace, particularly in Indonesia and the region in general.		are states from outside the region that have the potential to disrupt regional security stability, then for ASEAN it is unacceptable. The basic essence of asserting the centrality and unity of ASEAN is by emphasizing the importance of communication and transparency so that mutual trust can be strengthened. One of the tools to assert ASEAN's centrality in the region is to implement AOIP. Indonesia as the chairman of ASEAN 2023 took the initiative to downgrade the
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			AOIP concept into real activities that can be implemented in real terms. Indonesia plans to view AOIP from a defense perspective so that there will be a draft regarding what future defense guidance will be like.
Q6	Regarding the implementation of the centrality of ASEAN itself, in response to the rivalry between the US and China ASEAN member states are divided into three blocks. The three blocks are pro-China, contra-China, and neutral. Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia can be said to be pro-	In bringing up a power to face other forces, there will be fears that can become a new threat. The views of ASEAN member states on AUKUS differ depending on the point of view of the state's interests, if based on their national interests it does not threaten regional security stability, it means there is no	ASEAN collectively and individually must remain impartial to any major power that seeks to expand its hegemony in the region. The fact that indeed the two major powers are trying to invite ASEAN member states to join alliances with them cannot be denied. But the

China states. Meanwhile, the Philippines and Vietnam, which are claimant states in the South China Sea conflict, are counter-states with China. Indonesia and Malaysia are ASEAN member states that choose a neutral stance. There are differences in stances among ASEAN member states which ultimately lead to not unified statements from ASEAN as an organization. So without the unified statement of its members, the centrality of ASEAN will be difficult to assert.	problem and AUKUS is a defensive action by Australia but vice versa, if it is threatened, it means an offensive action that complicates regional security. Statements with alibis will not sideline and weaken ASEAN centrality, this is what needs to be worried about for ASEAN centrality because in the future it may no longer be considered by major power states because they only prioritize their interests. ASEAN member states in responding to changes in the security constellation in the	fact is that until now there are no ASEAN member states that have taken a partial stance, so this is ASEAN's central and united. The issue of ASEAN centrality cannot be separated from the issue of ASEAN unity, because to maintain ASEAN's centrality, ASEAN must be unity first. ASEAN centrality can only be strong if ASEAN member states can be united. So with ASEAN's centrality and unity, ASEAN will have more bargaining power toward states
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		region such as AUKUS are divided into three blocks which may have the potential to break up regional unity in ASEAN. Amid competition between the US and China, states in ASEAN may become closer to the United States, and others closer to China while the rest choose neutral. What's more, it shows again the waning centrality of ASEAN to build regional security stability.	outside the region.
Q7	To achieve a strong regional security defense to support regional economic progress, the centrality of ASEAN must be emphasized. ASEAN centrality	After the emergence of AUKUS, ASEAN is increasingly required to navigate the increasingly sharp rivalry of major power states for the	ASEAN's outlook on the Indo-Pacific is an attempt to emphasize ASEAN's centrality, but the arrival of AUKUS complicates

	can be emphasized by efforts to maximize ongoing dialogue forums by ASEAN to prevent potential conflicts from arising. AUKUS is aimed at counterbalancing China's military rise, but at the same time, it also shows ASEAN's non-centrality in balancing the major power state competition in the region. Although they have requested that external parties respect ASEAN's centrality, there is nothing ASEAN can implement in the face of AUKUS, China, and other major power states in the region. The competition between the US	sake of regional security stability. ASEAN member states are currently divided in views on several major issues, such as the issue of the South China Sea dispute and responding to AUKUS. Each ASEAN member state has different positions, perspectives, and interests on this issue. This condition makes ASEAN member states vulnerable to being divided and exploited by major power states. ASEAN can strengthen its regional security architecture by promoting greater cooperation and coordination among its member	matters in the region. Indonesia was the first state to remind Australia of its commitment to non-proliferation and overall regional stability, referring to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has long contributed to the regional security architecture through its leadership role in ASEAN, with the aim of curbing the domination of major powers and promoting stability through collective leadership. This was weakened by the arrival of AUKUS, which
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	and China in the Indo-Pacific has the potential to threaten ASEAN's centrality in its region.	states in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, and disaster relief. This can be achieved through the implementation of existing frameworks such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).	occurred without consultation with Indonesia or ASEAN. For Indonesia, this indicates that the major power states do not consider ASEAN member states important in calculating the security of the region. By using the AOIP as a basis for its response to AUKUS, ASEAN can promote a comprehensive and cooperative approach to regional security, based on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusivity, and respect for international law. This can help to
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			manage the impact of AUKUS on ASEAN member states and promote regional peace, stability, and development.
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Source: The Researcher, 2023

China's rise over the past few years has represented a shift in the regional balance of power and is arguably an attack on the legitimacy of the US-led liberal international order. ASEAN is essentially caught in the middle, as a region to compete and expand major power states markets and influence, with the risk that the region will be dominated by the US or China, or even both, and this will undermine ASEAN unity and centrality. Moreover, China is very aggressive because of its increasing economic power. This position causes ASEAN member states to develop strong economic relations with China because of the economic benefits it receives. Thus, ASEAN needs to take a central position to maintain good relations with the US and China and at the same time prevent one party from dominating the region. Given the fact that the US and China are both pursuing expansive strategies to increase their dominance and influence in the region, dividing the region into competing blocs.

September 2021 is a time when ASEAN centrality is being challenged. AUKUS is a clear move against China and raises concerns among ASEAN member states that have yet to have a coordinated response. Some welcomed it, some were ambivalent and others worried it would fuel further US-China rivalries. AUKUS demonstrated a clear US intention to enhance its strategic shift to the Indo-Pacific. The emergence of AUKUS itself can be

said as a response to ASEAN's weak central role in reducing tensions that have increased amid geostrategic shifts in the region.

In addition to the interview results, the researcher also collected secondary data to answer the first problem formulation in the form of a questionnaire and with indicators of key issues related to the role of Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS which will later be calculated and categorized according to Arikunto's theory. (2006), the following researchers describe the results of the questionnaire with a scale of 1-10;

Table 4.4
Key Issues

NO	IDENTIFIED INDICATORS	INFORMANTS (I)		
		I1	I2	I3
1	Difference responses among ASEAN member states in responding to AUKUS	8	8	7
2	ASEAN is to not be marginalized by the emergence of a partnership that is not ASEAN-Centric.	7	8	9
3	Indonesia's current relation with AUKUS member states especially after the announcement of AUKUS	7	6	6
4	Regional security stability condition after the emergence of AUKUS	9	8	8
5	Under the provisions of the 1955 Bangkok Treaty, ASEAN member states have committed to keeping the region free from nuclear weapons and other mass destruction	9	9	8

6	The AOIP concept as the basis and mindset for forming strategies to deal with AUKUS and Chinese rivalry in the region	8	8	9
7	The role of Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert ASEAN centrality	9	9	9
8	AUKUS is seen as a response to China's growing influence in the region, which could lead to a more competitive and potentially destabilizing dynamic.	7	8	7
9	ASEAN need to adapt to the emergence of AUKUS and find ways to continue to play a central role in the region despite the partnership.	7	7	6
10	Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 need to ensure that the emergence of AUKUS does not lead to increased tensions and instability in the region.	8	8	7
COUNT		79	87	76
TOTAL PERCENTAGE (%)		80,67		

The results of the proportion calculation above show that the figure obtained from the three sources is 80.67%. Furthermore, these numbers are categorized with the theory described above and will be explained in the next sub-chapter.

4.3 Data Processing Result

Research that has been carried out by the researcher is then processed by focusing on the questions in the formulation of the problem, so that the data obtained can systematically support this research. First of all, the validity of the data obtained is validated through a triangulation process, so that the data obtained both from references in the literature and from

sources do not contradict with each other. The data is then classified as material for comparison between one informant and another to narrow down the data analysis.

4.3.1 Indonesia's Perspective as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Responding to The Emergence of AUKUS

The results of the questionnaire containing data on key issues regarding the implementation of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS were calculated to produce an average percentage in the form of (%) and these results were given a scale value according to Arikunto's theory (2006). In the following, the researcher describes the results of data processing;

Table 4.5
Influence Scale and Criteria

SCALE	CRITERIA
80%-100%	Very Influential
70%-79%	Influential
60%-69%	Fairly Influential
50%-59%	Less Influential
0%-49%	Very Less Influential

Source: Suharsimi Arikunto (2006)

Table 4.6
Result Data of Key Issues

NO	IDENTIFIED INDICATORS	INFORMANTS (I)		
		I1	I2	I3
1	Difference responses among ASEAN member states in responding to AUKUS	8	8	7
2	The implementation of ASEAN centrality is to not be marginalized by the emergence of a partnership that is not ASEAN-Centric.	7	8	9

3	ASEAN's current relation with AUKUS member states especially after the announcement of AUKUS	7	6	6
4	Regional security stability condition after the emergence of AUKUS	9	8	8
5	Under the provisions of the 1955 Bangkok Treaty, ASEAN member states have committed to keeping the region free from nuclear weapons and other mass destruction	9	9	8
6	The AOIP concept as the basis and mindset for forming strategies to deal with AUKUS and Chinese rivalry in the region	8	8	9
7	The role of Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert ASEAN centrality	9	9	9
8	AUKUS is seen as a response to China's growing influence in the region, which could lead to a more competitive and potentially destabilizing dynamic.	7	8	7
9	ASEAN need to adapt to the emergence of AUKUS and find ways to continue to play a central role in the region despite the partnership.	7	7	6
10	ASEAN need to ensure that the emergence of AUKUS does not lead to increased tensions and instability in the region.	8	8	7
COUNT		79	87	76
TOTAL PERCENTAGE (%)		80,67		
SCALE LEVEL		VERY INFLUENTIAL		

The result data shows that from three sources the proportion value is 80.67%. These results categorize by the theory of Arikunto (2006) whose results are **very influential**.

4.3.2 Indonesia's possible strategies as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Asserting The Role of ASEAN Centrality after The Emergence of AUKUS

After interpreting the interview results and conducting literature research, the collected data was processed using SWOT Analysis to determine Indonesia's possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS. In the SWOT analysis, weighting and rating of each internal factor (IFAS) and external factor (EFAS) are carried out based on the level of urgency and/or influence on the situation and conditions of the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS.

Table 4.7
IFAS Weighting and Scoring

IFAS Item		Weight (W) 0-1	Score (S) 1-4	Weight x Score (WxS)
Strength				
S1	Geostrategic Location	0,1	4	0,4
S2	Economic Influence as a Regional Organization	0,1	3	0,3
S3	Inclusive ASEAN-Led Multilateral Mechanism	0,05	3	0,15
S4	Regional Connectivity and Infrastructure Development	0,05	2	0,1
S5	ASEAN member states strong commitment to creating political	0,1	3	0,3

	stability and security in the Southeast Asian region through TAC			
S6	Firm method of diplomacy known as the ASEAN Way	0,1	3	0,3
S7	Cultural Diversity and Cooperation	0,25	1	0,25
S8	Indonesia strong leadership	0,1	2	0,2
S9	Indonesia proactive diplomacy	0,1	2	0,2
S10	Indonesia strong commitment to ASEAN	0,05	3	0,15
Total Strength		1		2,35

IFAS Item		Weight (W) 0-1	Score (S) 1-4	Weight x Score (WxS)
Weaknesses				
W1	Differences in interests and ideologies	0,2	1	0,2
W2	Uneven Economic & Military Development	0,2	2	0,4
W3	Dependence on External Powers	0,15	1	0,15
W4	Limited Cooperation in Security Affairs	0,1	2	0,2
W5	Limited Institutional Capacity	0,05	2	0,1
W6	Human Rights Concerns	0,025	3	0,075
W7	Environmental Challenges	0,025	4	0,1
W8	Indonesia's domestic political instability	0,05	3	0,075
W9	Indonesia's limited military resources	0,1	2	0,2
W10	Indonesia's low technologies readiness	0,1	2	0,2
Total Weaknesses		1		1,7

Table 4.8
EFAS Weighting and Scoring

EFAS Item		Weight (W) 0-1	Score (S) 1-4	Weight x Score (WxS)
Opportunities				
O1	Enhancing regional security	0,2	3	0,6
O2	Strengthening defense capabilities	0,175	3	0,525
O3	Encouraging greater defense cooperation	0,2	2	0,4
O4	Promoting economic growth	0,025	1	0,025
O5	Supporting rules-based order	0,05	2	0,1
O6	Defense industry cooperation	0,025	2	0,05
O7	AUKUS as a Counterbalance of China's Hegemony	0,2	3	0,6
O8	Enhancing Capacity Building and Human Resources Development	0,05	1	0,05
O9	Developing Firm Trade and Investment Policies	0,025	1	0,025
O10	Promoting Regional Resilience	0,05	2	0,1
Total Opportunities		1		2,475

EFAS Item		Weight (W) 0-1	Score (S) 10-100	Weight x Score (WxS)
Threats				
T1	Territorial disputes in the South China Sea	0,15	2	0,3

T2	US-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region	0,1	1	0,1
T3	Increasing military tensions that can lead to an Arms Race	0,1	2	0,2
T4	The potential for a security dilemma	0,15	2	0,3
T5	Undermining ASEAN Centrality	0,2	1	0,2
T6	Challenging existing security frameworks	0,05	3	0,15
T7	Straining diplomatic relations	0,05	3	0,15
T8	Geographically, Potential to become a proxy battleground for US-China rivalry	0,1	1	0,1
T9	Potential for increased tension between ASEAN member states	0,075	2	0,15
T10	Fragmentation of ASEAN	0,025	3	0,075
Total Threats		1		1,725

Source: Processed by The Researcher (2023)

4.4 Data Interpretation

Data interpretation is a stage carried out to associate the relationship between various research variables with the object studied, so that in-depth research can be based on available data and information. Data interpretation involves interpreting the results of data analysis, so that data analysis can be processed as a process of sorting, categorizing, and summarizing data, to obtain answers to research questions. Based on the research data that has been processed, some data are of concern to the researcher. The data is then categorized systematically before giving meaning. The data that is the center of attention will be tested by checking the validity of the data, by triangulating the source from which the data was obtained so that the data is worthy of further examination.

4.4.1 Indonesia's Perspective as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Responding to The Emergence of AUKUS

The researcher uses the theory (Lykke, 2015) that In forming a strategy, Strategy Framework is needed which consists of ends, ways, and means. Ends are defined as the final goals to be realized from the strategy formed. Ways are defined as actions or efforts made to achieve the final goal. Means are defined as the resources used in action to achieve the final goal (Lykke, 2015). These three (3) elements are used to achieve strategic success, which if there is a failure means that one aspect has not been implemented well. The elements of means, ways, and ends are used to formulate the proper possible strategies.

The strategy has 3 elements and is linked with national defense theory, the researcher concludes that: Ends: what is the purpose of national defense strategy (to maintain regional security stability and protect national interests). Means: what are Indonesia's resources (Law No. 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for National Defense). Ways: How does Indonesia implement the possible strategies (by continuing to carry out peace dialogues between the parties). Indonesia has to develop a strategy that is very dependent on developments in the global, regional, and national strategic environment. Formulate the possible strategies based on threats, national environment, and state political policies. The strategy will not be the same in all situations. War expert Tsun Zu said, "don't use one strategy in two conditions".

From the theory used by the researcher and the results of the interviews above, it can be explained that Indonesia's perspective and possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS, including:

1. The emergence of AUKUS, an agreement between the US, UK, and Australia to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, has

caused deep concern from Indonesia and other ASEAN member states. AUKUS is seen as a threat to the military power balance in the region and a possible cause of a security dilemma. Australia has stated that AUKUS aims to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific region, but Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 is worried that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Bangkok Treaty regulations may be broken by the AUKUS. ASEAN member states also fear that AUKUS may lead to disruption in the region due to the major powers' states rivalry for hegemony.

2. Indonesia as Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 is committed to building a stronger ASEAN that is capable of protecting the region from external influences and maintaining its centrality among major power states rivalry. Through dialogue forums, ASEAN member states are urged to remain united and central to be the decision maker in issues related to regional interests. Indonesia has taken a cautious stance towards the emergence of AUKUS, aware that AUKUS might have an impact on the region's dynamics.
3. The formation of the AUKUS alliance reflects concerns over China's increasing military and economic influence in the Southeast Asian region. The US sought to balance the power by initiating AUKUS, which is expected to have a significant impact on the South China Sea dispute. Though not directly opposing China, AUKUS focuses on maritime security and technological cooperation, which can serve as a counterbalance to China's growing military presence and assertiveness.
4. Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 is aiming to create an environment of transparency and good communication between parties to prevent potential conflicts. Meanwhile, Australia is attempting to prove that nuclear-powered submarines can be used responsibly in the region. Indonesia, as ASEAN's chairmanship this year, will prioritize free-active politics and work to strengthen regional

cooperation while maintaining security and peace. Indonesia through ASEAN will use diplomatic engagement, legal remedies, and regional security cooperation to address any potential violations of the SEANWFZ (Bangkok Treaty) and NPT by the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines. All states must comply with the principle of ASEAN centrality in order for ASEAN to remain vigilant and proactive in promoting peace and stability.

5. Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN this year is taking proactive measures to promote regional stability and security. Through dialogue forums and by emphasizing communication and transparency, Indonesia through ASEAN aims to prevent potential conflicts, maintain peace, and strengthen mutual trust. Indonesia has proposed to downgrade the AOIP concept and view it from a defense perspective. Additionally, Australia can convince ASEAN member states that nuclear-powered submarines can be used responsibly. Ultimately, Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 is working to create a conducive region and it is unacceptable for external states to have the potential to disrupt regional security stability.
6. ASEAN member states have differing views on their response to the US-China rivalry and the power dynamic in the region, leading to an inability to present a unified statement. This weakens ASEAN's centrality, which is at risk of being undermined by major power states who prioritize their interests. ASEAN must remain impartial to any major power, and its centrality is dependent on its unity. To maintain ASEAN's centrality and bargaining power, Indonesia as the chairmanship this year must ensure ASEAN must remain united.
7. Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 must emphasize ASEAN centrality to achieve a strong regional security defense that supports economic progress. The emergence of AUKUS has complicated matters in the region, as major power states do not consider ASEAN member states important in calculating security

matters. To respond, Indonesia as ASEAN's chairmanship this year can use the AOIP to promote a cooperative approach to regional security that is based on openness, transparency, inclusivity, and respect for international law. This can help manage AUKUS' impact on the role of ASEAN centrality and promote regional peace, stability, and development.

The question in the first problem formulation focuses on how Indonesia's Perspective as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Responding to The Emergence of AUKUS, hence it's important to map the opportunities and potential threats to the implementation of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS in realizing Indonesia's possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting ASEAN centrality and maintaining security stability in the region.

a. Negative Impacts

Data interpretation in this category is the answer collected by researchers through interviews with each of the informants regarding the negative impacts that will or have occurred for Indonesia and Southeast Asia region after the emergence of AUKUS. The emergence of AUKUS on 16 September 2022 is a controversial issue in the region. The planned procurement of nuclear-powered submarines enhances Australia's naval deterrence against China's growing naval power. The data obtained from each source leads to the same negative impact, which is feared to threaten the political stability and security of Southeast Asia region because even though AUKUS is known to only be in the form of defense cooperation, it is a sign that shakes ASEAN's centrality. AUKUS is a crucial issue for ASEAN, considering that ASEAN has the principle of centrality, where ASEAN is a key player in decision-making and the future of the region.

The researcher maps out that the emergence of AUKUS will bring ASEAN into a security dilemma where the procurement of nuclear submarines for Australia will bring about a new chapter in the arms race in the region. According to Colonel Imam S. Cahyono, S.S., M.Sc Middle Policy Analyst for CB, CBM & Preventive Diplomacy, the emergence of AUKUS will trigger an arms race in the region. According to realist theory, states in the region will view Australia's procurement of nuclear-powered submarines as a threat, so an increase in defense capability is needed. As a result, ASEAN member states will face a rapidly growing military force in their region. Meanwhile, ASEAN member states seek a strategic balance between the major power states to ensure regional security stability.

Another negative impact of AUKUS can be said to divide ASEAN and disrupt its political and security integration process. This can be seen from the various responses from ASEAN member states to AUKUS. Not all ASEAN member states have the same capacity for firm decision-making in the international system, even though ASEAN is geographically the center of the region. ASEAN remains divided and torn between maintaining US political and security support or seeking to benefit from economic and trade projects with China. The absence of a common perception and commitment will make it difficult for ASEAN to assert its centrality and become a regional organization that is strong and influential in the region.

b. Positive Impacts

When viewed through the perspective of neorealist theory, the emergence of AUKUS can be said as the balance of power. In this theory, it is explained that balance of power is a form of effort to balance power carried out by a state/group of states by cooperating with other states/groups of states to deal with other states/groups of states that are a threat, which by thereby creating stability and peace (J. Mearsheimer,

2014). The researcher gathered data that several ASEAN member states which responded quite positively to AUKUS argued that the emergence of AUKUS could be a counterbalance to China's strength in the region. Even the Philippines maintains that, without building nuclear weapons, efforts to build nuclear-powered ships would not violate a non-proliferation treaty. Furthermore, Singaporean Ambassador to Indonesia Anil Kumar Nayar said Singapore welcomed Australia's commitment so that AUKUS could advance and maintain stability and security in the Indo-Pacific (Kurniasih & Umar, 2022).

If ASEAN can avoid obstacles, navigate the geopolitical situation, and create regional consensus, ASEAN will be able to turn the negative impact of the emergence of AUKUS into beneficial opportunities for the region as a whole. ASEAN has the opportunity to assert the concept of centrality so that it is taken into account amid competition from major power states in the region. Through competition between China and the US in the region there are opportunities for ASEAN member states to obtain, for example, opportunities for trade, investment, and transfer of defense and security technology. By putting forward the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN strengthens the regional architecture through an ASEAN-lead mechanism and a commitment to maximizing opportunities from the current regional dynamics with regional and global cooperation. With these opportunities, ASEAN must be a strategic driving force behind the establishment of a multilateral framework for security cooperation in the region.

4.4.2 Indonesia's Possible Strategies as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Asserting The Role of ASEAN Centrality after The Emergence of AUKUS

Even though Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 has sufficient perspective and strategic planning to emphasize the role of ASEAN's centrality as the center in the region. However, the implementation

of asserting the role of ASEAN centrality by Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 still requires improvements. Therefore, these perspectives and strategic plans still have to be analyzed to determine the ideal strategy that can be implemented. This needs to be done to emphasize that ASEAN's role is as a center for regional architecture.

The process of analyzing the factors that influence strategic planning for affirming the role of ASEAN centrality, especially in response to the emergence of AUKUS, uses SWOT analysis to determine the Internal Strategic Factors Analysis Summary (IFAS), which consists of Strengths and Weaknesses, and External Strategic Factors Analysis Summary (EFAS) which consists of Opportunities and Threats.

These factors were obtained from processing data collected through interviews and literature studies. This analysis will then produce a strategy related to the intersection of each group of factors and the determination of weights and rankings. In general, weighting is given subjectively depending on the level of importance as the data presented above. The weight rating of each factor has a scale ranging from 0.0 (not important) to 1.0 (most important). Then, multiply by the rating on a scale of 1 (poor) to 4 (excellent) for the Strengths and Opportunities Scale and the rating on a scale of 1 (Excellent) to 4 (poor) for Weaknesses and Threats. Which produces a total score to show how Indonesia on behalf of ASEAN reacts to its internal and external strategic factors. The following is the interpretation of the data according to the IFAS and EFAS tables:

1) Strength

ASEAN's strengths through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality:

- a. Geostrategic Location: The researcher gives a weight 0.1 because of this factor has helped Indonesia to emerge as a key player in the global economy and diplomacy.

- b. Economic Influence as a Regional Organization: ASEAN is one of the fastest growing regions in the world, with a combined GDP of over \$3 trillion in 2020, hence the researcher gave weight of 0.1.
- c. Inclusive ASEAN-Led Multilateral Mechanism: The researcher give weight of 0.05 to this indicator due to it has helped to ensure that all member states have a voice in shaping regional policy and decision-making, regardless of their size or level of development.
- d. Regional Connectivity and Infrastructure Development: ASEAN have made significant progress in developing transportation, communication, and energy infrastructure to support economic growth and development in the region, hence the researcher give weight of 0.05.
- e. ASEAN member states strong commitment to creating political stability and security in the Southeast Asian region through TAC: The TAC has been instrumental in helping to resolve conflicts and maintain stability in Southeast Asia, hence the researcher give weight of 0.1.
- f. Firm method of diplomacy known as the ASEAN Way: The ASEAN Way has been critical in maintaining regional peace and stability by promoting mutual respect and understanding between member states due to that reason the researcher gives the weight of 0.1.
- g. Cultural Diversity and Cooperation: The researcher gives the weight of 0.25 due the reason that despite these differences, ASEAN member states have worked together to promote cultural cooperation and exchange.
- h. Indonesia Strong Leadership: The researcher gives the weight of 0.1 due to the reason Indonesia has a strong leadership that is capable of providing the necessary guidance to navigate the complex geopolitical situation in the region.
- i. Indonesia Proactive Diplomacy: The researcher gives the weight of 0.1 due to the reason Indonesia has a long-standing tradition of

proactive diplomacy, which has enabled it to take a leadership role in the ASEAN region. This proactive diplomacy can be used to build diplomatic bridges between AUKUS member states and ASEAN member states.

- j. Indonesia's Strong Commitment to ASEAN: The researcher gives the weight of 0.05 due to the reason Indonesia is a founding member of ASEAN and has been a strong supporter of the organization since its inception. Indonesia has actively participated in ASEAN-led initiatives such as the ASEAN Summit, the ARF, and the ASEAN+3 Summit, and has consistently made significant economic, political and security contributions. Since 2011, Indonesia has held the ASEAN chairmanship three times.

Furthermore, researchers have a total weight that has been multiplied by a rating based on the influence of these conditions. Therefore, the result of the IFAS calculation which is a strength for ASEAN through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality is 2.35.

2) Weakness

ASEAN weaknesses through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality:

- a. Differences in interests and ideologies: The researcher gives a considerable weight of 0.2 because ASEAN member states have diverse ideologies and national interests, and may have different priorities when it comes to regional issues.
- b. Uneven Economic & Military Development: The researcher assigns a weight of 0.2 due to some member states may feel that their economic and military interests are not being adequately represented, which can lead to disagreements and delays in decision-making.

- c. Dependence on External Powers: ASEAN's reliance on external powers, such as the US and China, for economic and security support, poses a risk to the ASEAN's unity and independence, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.15.
- d. Limited Cooperation in Security Affairs: The researcher give weight of 0.1 because ASEAN's security cooperation is often limited by political tensions among member states, resulting in a lack of effective regional development.
- e. Limited Institutional Capacity: ASEAN's institutions and mechanisms for regional integration are often criticized for their limited capacity to enforce decisions and implement policies effectively, hence the researcher assigns a weight of 0.05.
- f. Human Right Concerns: ASEAN has been criticized for being slow to respond to human rights abuses and violations in the region due to the diversity of political systems and approaches to human rights among member states, hence the researcher give weight of 0.025.
- g. Environmental Challenges: The researcher assigns weight of 0.025 due to the reason that development and economic activities such as mining, logging, and agriculture can have significant impacts on the environment.
- h. Indonesia's Domestic Political Instability: The researcher assigns a weight of 0.05 due to the reason Indonesia is currently facing a period of political instability which could hamper its ability to effectively respond to the emergence of AUKUS. The current political situation in Indonesia could also lead to a lack of commitment to the security of the region, thus making it difficult for Indonesia to respond effectively to the security challenges posed by AUKUS.
- i. Indonesia's Limited Military Resources: The researcher assigns a weight of 0.1 due to the reason Indonesia is facing financial constraints in terms of developing its military capabilities and enhancing its intelligence capabilities. This poses a challenge for

Indonesia in terms of responding to the security threat posed by AUKUS.

- j. Indonesia's low technologies readiness: The researcher assigns a weight of 0.1 due to the reason Indonesia still has low rank in technologies readiness, which affects its ability to use digital technologies to manage and monitor AUKUS activities. Indonesia also lacks the necessary infrastructure and technical capabilities to ensure effective monitoring of AUKUS activities.

Furthermore, researchers have a total weight that has been multiplied by a rating based on the influence of these conditions. Therefore, the result of the IFAS calculation which is a weakness for ASEAN through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality is 1.7.

3) Opportunity

ASEAN opportunities from the emergence of AUKUS through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality:

- a. Enhancing regional security: AUKUS is expected to enhance regional security in the region, which includes ASEAN member states. This could lead to greater stability and predictability in the region, which would benefit ASEAN, hence the researcher give weight of 0.2.
- b. Strengthening defense capabilities: The researcher gives the weight of 0.175 because AUKUS could lead to the development of new military technologies and capabilities that could be shared with ASEAN member states. This could enhance ASEAN member states defense capabilities and enable them to have better respond to regional security challenges.
- c. Encouraging greater defense cooperation: The researcher assigns the weight of 0.2 due to the emergence of AUKUS could lead to joint

military exercises, intelligence sharing, and other forms of collaboration that could benefit ASEAN.

- d. Promoting economic growth: The development of new military technologies and capabilities could lead to the creation of new jobs and industries, which would benefit the region's economy, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.025.
- e. Supporting rules-based order: The researcher gives the weight of 0.05 because ASEAN have opportunity to work with its external partners to promote the rules-based order in the region.
- f. Defense industry cooperation: One potential area for cooperation is in defense research and development. ASEAN member states could explore opportunities to collaborate with AUKUS member states on the development of advanced defense technologies, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.025.
- g. AUKUS as a Counterbalance of China's Hegemony: The researcher assigns the weight of 0.2 because by deepening its partnership with AUKUS, ASEAN can enhance its own security capabilities and deter any potential aggression from China.
- h. Enhancing Capacity Building and Human Resources Development: The researcher assigns the weight of 0.05 because Indonesia can use its chairmanship to facilitate capacity building and human resources development programs for ASEAN member states. This can help ASEAN gain a better understanding of the implications of AUKUS and how to best respond to them.
- i. Developing Firm Trade and Investment Policies: The researcher assigns the weight of 0.025 because Indonesia can use its chairmanship to help ASEAN member states develop more firm trade and investment policies that will help them take advantage of the opportunities presented by AUKUS
- j. Promoting Regional Resilience: The researcher assigns the weight of 0.05 because Indonesia can use its chairmanship to promote

greater regional resilience and ensure that ASEAN member states are better prepared to respond to the threats posed by AUKUS.

Furthermore, researchers have a total weight that has been multiplied by a rating based on the influence of these conditions. Therefore, the result of the EFAS calculation which is an opportunity for ASEAN from the emergence of AUKUS through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality is 2.475.

4) Threat

ASEAN threats from the emergence of AUKUS through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality:

- a. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea: These disputes involve overlapping territorial claims by several ASEAN member states, as well as China, and have been a source of tension and conflict in the region for many years, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.15.
- b. US-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region: The researcher gives the weight of 0.1 because The US-China rivalry has intensified in recent years, with both seeking to advance their strategic interests and influence in the region. This has led to increased competition and tensions, which have the potential to undermine ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality and promote regional cooperation.
- c. Increasing military tensions that can lead to an Arms Race: These tensions can potentially lead to an arms race, which would further exacerbate the security situation in the region, hence the researcher assigns weight of 0.1.
- d. The potential for a security dilemma: The researcher gives the weight of 0.15 due to the potential for a security dilemma is further compounded by the complex web of alliances and partnerships which is not ASEAN-centric in the region.

- e. Undermining ASEAN Centrality: With the emergence of AUKUS could undermine ASEAN's role as a regional mediator and provider of regional stability, potentially eroding its influence and centrality, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.2.
- f. Challenging existing security frameworks: The researcher gives the weight of 0.05 because AUKUS, which not involves ASEAN member states, could be seen as a challenge to the TAC and the existing regional security architecture.
- g. Straining diplomatic relations: AUKUS was announced without consultation with ASEAN or its member states, which could be seen as a lack of respect for ASEAN's centrality in the region, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.05.
- h. Geographically, Potential to become a proxy battleground for US-China rivalry: This is because ASEAN in a unique geographic position at the center of Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN region is also home to a wide range of resources, including economic resources and strategic military bases, which makes them attractive to both the US and China, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.1.
- i. Potential for increased tension between ASEAN member states: ASEAN member states give various responses to AUKUS due to the various geopolitical, economic and cultural issues that divide them. These differences can lead to increased tensions between member states as they attempt to find a resolution, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.075.
- j. Fragmentation of ASEAN: AUKUS could create a power imbalance within ASEAN, as AUKUS member states have significantly greater economic, political and military power than the other members of ASEAN. This could lead to a situation where ASEAN is split between those states that are pro to AUKUS, and those that are not, hence the researcher gives the weight of 0.025.

Furthermore, researchers have a total weight that has been multiplied by a rating based on the influence of these conditions. Therefore, the result of the EFAS calculation which is a threat for ASEAN from the emergence of AUKUS through the chairmanship of Indonesia 2023 in asserting its centrality is 1.725.

Based on the IFAS and EFAS tables, it can be seen that ASEAN's strengths are weighted 2.35 and ASEAN's weaknesses are 1.7. Then in determining IFAS, the strength weight divided by the weakness weight possessed by ASEAN so that the IFAS weight is 1.382. Then in calculating EFAS, researchers get an ASEAN opportunity weight of 2.475 and a threat for ASEAN of 1.725. In determining EFAS, ASEAN's opportunity weight is divided by ASEAN's threat weight to get an EFAS weight of 1.4202. As explained below:

Axis (x) - Internal Strategic Factors Analysis Summary (IFAS)

Total Strength Score : Total Weakness Score

$$2.35 : 1.7 = 1.382$$

Axis (y) - External Strategic Factors Analysis Summary (EFAS)

Total Opportunity Score - Total Threat Score

$$2.475 : 1.725 = 1.4202$$

Swot Analysis Coordinate Points

(X, Y)


(1.382, 1.4202)

Then, the researcher has the conclusion that the external factors owned by Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 are greater than the internal factors, or described as follows:

$$O/T > S/W$$

The researcher uses the SWOT method with the formulas that the researcher has explained in chapter 3. Quadrant calculation results in the previous sub-chapter have shown that the IFAS Quadrant result is 1.382 and the EFAS Quadrant result is 1.4202, these numbers are the SWOT coordinates. Then the two results are distributed in the Cartesian diagram below.

Figure 4.1
SWOT Cartesian Diagram



Source: The Researcher (2023)

As explained earlier, the researcher get an IFAS weight of 1.382 and EFAS of 1.4202. Then the researcher placed these weights into the SWOT quadrant matrix as shown above and found a point that became the starting point of Indonesia's possible strategies as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS. This point explains that the value calculated above produces a strategy Strength-Opportunity (SO). Then the results of the above interpretation will be further explained in the next sub-chapter (discussion).

4.4.2.1 Ends

For the 'ends', ensuring ASEAN centrality aims to maintain regional stability and security through Indonesia's Chairmanship in 2023. ASEAN centrality will help reduce tensions and prevent conflicts from escalating, which is particularly important in a region characterized by multiple overlapping territorial and maritime disputes. The goal is to enact mutual trust and reduce suspicion through the commitment to CBMs in ADMM and later on, ADMM-Plus, in line with Indonesia's target to achieve a peaceful and stable region through cooperation with ASEAN member states (Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2015).

However, there are still many obstacles to deal with, and some are related to policies and technical matters, such as human capacity and technology adoption. Robert Mazzolin's research (2020) reminds us that for defense and security, regulatory and policy requirements, as well as technical issues, must be carefully considered. Thus, based on the previous explanation, Indonesia can intensify discussions to establish an appropriate strategy in ASEAN forums such as ARF, EAS, ADMM/ADMM-Plus, in response to AUKUS. Indonesia's position as the chairman of ASEAN in 2023 will support this intention.

4.4.2.2 Means

In terms of 'means', as discussed above regarding the SWOT analysis, Indonesia is positioned in the strengths and opportunities quadrant, which is a favorable position. All the defined strengths are at Indonesia's disposal, which can be used to ensure ASEAN centrality by leveraging all the opportunities. According to the research conducted by Mico A. Galang (2016), when the Philippines chaired ASEAN, it utilized the ASEAN cooperation forum to enforce ASEAN Centrality while dealing with the South China Sea issue.

Indonesia should harness the opportunity as the chairman of ASEAN 2023 effectively. Besides, having regional security cooperation with AUKUS member states can be the backdrop for Indonesia and ASEAN to increase the defense sector. The finding obtained from the interview is that among the key players of regional security issues for the defense sector in the state, there is a need to maintain intensive coordination. The Directorate of International Cooperation and the Directorate of Defense Strategy Policy in the Ministry of Defense, as well as the Directorate of ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, are supporting each other in ensuring ASEAN centrality through Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN 2023. Coupled with the previous explanation, it demonstrates that Indonesia has sufficient ability to play an active role in ensuring ASEAN centrality in maintaining regional security stability. Thus, to achieve this, inter-agency coordination between stakeholders must abandon the existing sectoral egos.

4.4.2.3 Ways

Speaking of 'ways', it means deciding on an appropriate course of action to implement defense diplomacy for CBMs according to the state's capacity. In terms of ensuring ASEAN centrality in responding to AUKUS, the actions taken should consider ASEAN's unity in speaking with one voice and working towards a common goal. It is necessary so that the designated steps can be implemented and provide the expected results. Dealing with the commitment to maintaining ASEAN centrality and unity in the region, Indonesia should also define the course of action as a form of defense diplomacy for CBMs. Considering the SWOT result, Indonesia's position to conduct a strategy is fully supported by Indonesia's disposal and available opportunities.

ASEAN has so far not had the significant bargaining power to impose order in the region. Ways that Indonesia can do to support the ensuring of

ASEAN centrality and unity, especially in maintaining security stability in the region and building trust, can be determined as follows:

1. Strengthening Defense Diplomacy

Defense diplomacy aims to build defense and security capacity, and increase mutual trust between states through a confidence-building measure mechanism. All forms of structured activity to prevent aggression, prevent the escalation of a conflict, reduce militaristic tensions, build mutual trust between states, and develop strategic cooperation are the means contained by defense diplomacy (Perwita, 2022). Defense diplomacy aims to work together to build and enhance mutual trust. Hence it is the same priority to emphasize the centrality of ASEAN that will be realized if ASEAN is unity by increasing mutual trust. Then it can realize the goals of defense diplomacy through the ASEAN outlook in the Indo-Pacific along with its plan of action in asserting a central and unity ASEAN for security stability in the region. Through AOIP, ASEAN can organize regular high-level defense dialogues among member states to discuss regional security issues and build trust. This can help to promote greater understanding and cooperation among defense officials and military personnel.

2. Strengthening Confidence Building Measures within ASEAN member states

Confidence Building Measure (CBM) is a diplomatic activity aimed at easing tensions and solving problems between countries, either unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally. So that it is known as a practice that is applied globally to eliminate the causes of distrust, fear, the tension between states, prevent war, create stability, resolve conflicts, and expand strategic cooperation. In an interview with Rolliansyah Soemirat, he conveyed that asserting the centrality of ASEAN after the emergence of AUKUS could be carried out through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security issues which are a

common concern in the region. The first stage in ARF is the promotion of CBM, which allows ARF participants to discuss political and security issues in the region at a pace comfortable to all. CBMs are crucial for ASEAN currently as the region faces a range of security challenges. By promoting trust and understanding, reducing the risk of conflict, addressing non-traditional security challenges, enhancing regional cooperation, and strengthening ASEAN centrality, CBMs can help to create a more cooperative, peaceful, and prosperous ASEAN region. Therefore, Indonesia as the chairman of ASEAN this year must be able to encourage the strengthening of ARF.

3. Arrange Cooperative Security

AUKUS member states need to be involved in serious confidence-building in the region. Here, there is an important role for ASEAN to promote cooperative security between the two major power states that compete for hegemony in the region and tend to have an impact on regional security stability. Cooperative security is a security concept that seeks to use dialogue, consultation, and building mutual trust without having to go through a formal-institutional approach to create peace (Zulkarnain, 2014). Cooperative security aims to encourage the creation of peace based on common norms, rules, procedures, and transparent and communicative exchange of information (Adhitama, 2019 C.E.).

To achieve the goal of cooperative security, the dialogue carried out between the parties concerned with the ASEAN initiative must be comprehensive in the sense that it involves important aspects of regional security and defense. All actions that are offensive and have the potential to pose a threat to states in the region, such as the possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must be prohibited and prioritize defensive strategies to ward off offensive interference from outside the region. Transparency and information sharing between parties is very

important to know the conditions of each party in harmony with each other and minimize suspicion.

4.5 Discussion

After celebrating 70 years of the US-Australia alliance on 1 September 2021, in a historic step, the US and Australia jointly announced the establishment of a trilateral security partnership called “AUKUS” with the UK on 15 September 2021 to promote security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and realize the integration of the three countries in science, technology, industry and defense-related supply chains. As a sign of goodwill and as AUKUS’ “first initiative”, the US is committed to providing Australia with a nuclear powered submarine fleet. AUKUS, historically is the only multilateral military partnership that has emerged in the Indo-Pacific region in the last three decades (Cheng, 2022). The US and UK commitment to facilitate Australia’s acquisition of a nuclear-powered fleet of at least eight ships to replace its aging Collins-class conventionally powered fleet will make Australia the seventh country in the world with a major symbol of military power.

The emergence of AUKUS was a surprise to many political and policy circles around the world. France reacted angrily, as an existing deal with Australia to develop diesel-powered submarines was now about to be scrapped, and France was kept in the dark when the AUKUS arrangement was being discussed. China responded with strong criticism of AUKUS. A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged that nuclear-powered submarine cooperation among the three states was “grossly irresponsible”, escalating regional tensions and an arms race while threatening international nuclear non-proliferation efforts (Xinhua 2021). Many US allies in Asia, including Japan and South Korea, show a positive stance towards AUKUS. Initial reactions from the EU and its member states were mixed: some expressed dismay at the secrecy in the AUKUS negotiations, while others continued to show support (Marafona 2021).

Apart from that, many discussions about AUKUS focused on the reaction and what impact it would have on ASEAN and its ten member states and how the role of ASEAN's centrality was asserted in responding to the emergence of AUKUS.

4.5.1 Indonesia's Perspective as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Responding to The Emergence of AUKUS

Seeing the crucial existence of AUKUS in the conflict between the US and China for regional security stability has led to various responses from ASEAN member states, especially the six main maritime states in Southeast Asia, as quoted from the ISEAS Perspective:

Indonesia

In a statement on September 17, 2021, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it was "cautiously" taking note of AUKUS, and stressed that Indonesia was "deeply concerned" over the "continuing arms race and power projection in the region". Indonesia asks Australia to continue fulfilling its nuclear non-proliferation obligations and asks Australia to maintain its commitment to regional peace and security through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) to which Australia is also a High Contracting Party ((Statement on Australia's Nuclear-Powered Submarines Program, 2021). It should be noted that Indonesia's fears of an "arms race and continuing power projection" refer to the three AUKUS member states and all states with interests in the region, including China. A more detailed response to AUKUS was disclosed by senior Indonesian diplomat Abdul Kadir Jailani. Writing in the Jakarta Post, Abdul Kadir Jailani confirmed Indonesia's response but added that it appeared no international norms had been violated. He added that "deeper conversations" about AUKUS would help build mutual trust, confidence, and diplomacy ((Jailani, 2021).

Malaysia

Malaysia's response to AUKUS was predictable and true to the long-standing motto of regional security. In a phone call with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and reiterated in an official statement, Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob expressed concern that the new security arrangements could become a catalyst for a nuclear arms race in the region and might provoke some states to act aggressively, especially in the South China Sea. In expressing these concerns, he stressed Malaysia's commitment to Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Free, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the SEANFWZ treaty, as well as Malaysia's stance not to allow nuclear-powered ships into its territorial waters. Later, Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein and Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah issued their statements, asserting the Prime Minister's concerns (ANNOUNCEMENT BY AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES ON ENHANCED TRILATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP – AUKUS, 2021). Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad also warned that AUKUS increases the risk of major power-state conflicts in the region (Azmi, 2021).

Philippines

The Philippines was the first ASEAN member state to announce support for AUKUS. But the positive response to AUKUS from the Philippines has gone from warm to cold depending on who is making the statement (Popioco, 2022). Philippine foreign affairs secretary Teodoro Locsin welcomed AUKUS positively, claiming that AUKUS will help maintain peace and stability in the region. He sees AUKUS as a counterbalance against Chinese aggression in the region, particularly in

the South China Sea where China claims nearly 85 percent of the disputed waters under the nine-dash line. In his statement on September 19, Secretary Locsin explained the reasons behind the Philippines' support for AUKUS: a) there is currently an imbalance of power in Southeast Asia due to China's growing power and influence in the region; b) ASEAN member states do not have the military capability to maintain the balance of power in the region; while the main counterbalance, the US, is separated from Southeast Asia by the Pacific Ocean; and c) Australia with its nuclear-powered submarines will have the naval capability to respond promptly and will be able to maintain the balance of power in Southeast Asia. Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana asserted Secretary Locsin's position by stating that Australia, like the Philippines, had the right to increase its submarine defense capabilities (Castro, 2021). But a little over a week later, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte said he is worried AUKUS might precipitate a regional nuclear arms race, echoing the concerns of Malaysia and Indonesia (Popioco, 2022).

Singapore

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed his support for AUKUS. PM Lee's support was conveyed directly to Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison by telephone on Thursday 16 September 2021. At that time the PM of Singapore was contacted by the Australian PM who explained about the AUKUS agreement. As quoted from a press release published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore on the same day, it was written that PM Lee supports and has hopes for AUKUS. He mentioned that Singapore had long-standing bilateral relations with Australia, the UK, and the US, and hoped that AUKUS would contribute to regional peace and development (Iswara, 2021). Singapore perhaps has the most positive response with Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan "not unduly anxious" and Prime Minister Lee Hsien

Loong hoping "that AUKUS will contribute constructively to the peace and stability of the region and complement the regional architecture" (Tyler, 2022).

Vietnam

Responding to a question about Vietnam's stance on AUKUS, Vietnamese spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang emphasized that Vietnam always keeps track of current affairs in the region. "All states strive for the same goal of peace, stability, cooperation, and development in the region and around the world", said Hang, adding that states around the world have a responsibility to contribute to these goals. Regarding Australia's plans to build a nuclear submarine fleet, Hang said: "Nuclear energy should be developed and used for peaceful purposes and serve socio-economic development, ensuring security for people and the environment" (Anh, 2021). Vietnam's neutrality in response to AUKUS can be interpreted as covert support rather than opposition. Vietnam, as the target of China's coercive action, strongly supports the international rules-based order in the region in line with AUKUS commitments. Vietnam emphasized its strategic relationship with the three AUKUS member states and increased political trust, especially with Australia. Vietnam's pragmatic foreign policy has made its national interests the state's main priority (Nguyen, 2021).

Thailand

As a treaty ally of the US and a close strategic partner of China, Thailand has felt caught by the emergence of the AUKUS. Worried about being seen as taking sides, Thailand's leaders and government have yet to issue an official statement regarding AUKUS. Another factor of Thailand's caution is its leaders' preoccupation with domestic affairs. Notwithstanding, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha stressed in his speech at the United Nations that his state would support the Nuclear

Prohibition Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to analysts, this part of his speech shows that Thailand has doubts about AUKUS (Choong & Storey, 2021). The Thailand government's caution is shared by the state's leading analysts. Kavi argues that "Bangkok views the latest US move as a destabilizing factor, as it will put every state in the region on high alert" (Chongkittavorn, 2021).

The various stances of ASEAN member states towards the emergence of AUKUS certainly have an impact on the ability of ASEAN's centrality to take the right steps in addressing AUKUS. The negative impact for ASEAN is that it is caught between increasing economic cooperation and diplomatic closeness with China and on the other hand ASEAN still needs the US in its efforts to deal with China in the South China Sea conflict. The dilemmas and various stances of ASEAN member states have decreased ASEAN's central role in overcoming regional problems, especially concerning regional security. ASEAN centrality must be the main concern if ASEAN member states do not want to separate into two blocks which will only bring disruption to security stability in the region. ASEAN member states must continue to enlarge and assert their foreign policy hegemony to maintain security stability in the region.

If a state increases its military strength, it will raise concerns from other states which can lead to an arms race in the region. In the concept of international relations, the security dilemma exists as a concept that aims to analyze and explain what is happening between states and how states are trying to improve their security. AUKUS has a major agenda of providing nuclear-powered submarine assistance to Australia, and this will have the effect of creating a security dilemma whereby another rival nation will deploy or add a more sophisticated similar fleet which could lead to an arms race. This will increase tensions in the region which could result in open conflict. If there is an open conflict between China and AUKUS member states, the

ASEAN member states which are geographically located between the two states will be affected. Under the provisions of the 1955 Bangkok Treaty, ASEAN member states have committed to keeping the region free from nuclear weapons and other mass destruction. However, AUKUS' main agreement is the procurement of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia which can cause Southeast Asia to be surrounded by nuclear weapons due to the impact of the emergence of AUKUS.

The emergence of AUKUS has had a significant impact on the role of centrality of ASEAN as a regional organization in the Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN is in the middle of competition between major power states which causes ASEAN to be in a difficult position. Until now, ASEAN has not issued an official statement regarding AUKUS even though it has a significant political impact in the region. The absence of responses from ASEAN as an organization can be said caused by member states have different views on the emergence of AUKUS. Some ASEAN member states supports the emergence of this AUKUS and some states don't. The relationship between ASEAN member states and China also influences how ASEAN behaves towards AUKUS.

The difference in response between ASEAN member states does not reflect ASEAN's attitude as an organization but this affects the centrality and unity of ASEAN in the region. In addition, ASEAN member states also have their national interests to achieve, so it is difficult for ASEAN to state their collective stance, even though ASEAN needs to state their collective stance before this organization is divided by major powers. ASEAN is expected to become an independent and effective regional stabilizer in maintaining security and stability in the region. Thus, ASEAN needs to maintain its centrality in the region and show its collective attitude.

ASEAN needs to strengthen the implementation ASEAN centrality and unity in the region to maintain peace, security, and stability. Furthermore, AUKUS will shake up the ASEAN centrality architecture, the Southeast Asia

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (TAC). Before the formation of AUKUS, Australia as a neighboring ASEAN member state did not even think about discussing the AUKUS with ASEAN. The commitment of western states to promoting peace, stability, and respect for the centrality of ASEAN can be said to be 'lip service'.

4.5.2 Indonesia's Possible Strategies as The Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in Asserting The Role of ASEAN Centrality after The Emergence of AUKUS

Australia said that AUKUS would not reduce its support for an ASEAN-led regional architecture. However, neither Indonesia nor ASEAN is in a position to take this statement for granted. Even QUAD, which is more of a consultative forum, has not made major efforts to complement the ASEAN-led architecture. Australia can build trust by showing ASEAN member states how AUKUS will benefit in the long term, rather than being a threat in the future.

Australia must also enhance its defense relationship with ASEAN member states, which share a stake in maintaining a rules-based regional order. Australia should also continue to support ASEAN's main mechanisms for major power relations, in particular the planned AOIP and ARF activities. ASEAN's outlook on the Indo-Pacific is an attempt to emphasize ASEAN's centrality, but the arrival of AUKUS complicates matters in the region.

Abdul Kadir Jailani, director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Asian, Pacific, and African Affairs, said that Indonesia was the first state to remind Australia of its commitment to non-proliferation and overall regional stability, referring to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has long contributed to the regional security architecture through its leadership role in ASEAN, with the aim of curbing the domination of major powers and promoting stability through collective leadership. This was

weakened by the arrival of AUKUS, which occurred without consultation with Indonesia or ASEAN. For Indonesia, this indicates that the major power states do not consider ASEAN member states important in calculating the security of the region.

Based on the results of the study, researchers found points in the SWOT quadrant matrix which in the end, these points become an ideal possible strategy for Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS. This analysis arises because of the cross between each group of factors, weighting, and rating. Based on the weighting and ranking results above, it is known that the total value of IFAS is 1.1 and the total value of EFAS is 0.8. Therefore, IFAS is larger than EFAS. Then according to the calculations applied to the SWOT quadrant matrix Cartesian diagram, the IFAS and EFAS points are between the Strengths and Opportunities quadrants. Therefore, the best possible strategy for Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert the role of ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS is S O (Strengths – Opportunities), and it can be concluded that the SWOT analysis used by this researcher results in all powers of strengths being used to take advantage of the opportunities that exist, Indonesia can focus on strengths and opportunities factors as a tool to formulate a strategy in asserting ASEAN centrality through the chairmanship 2023 to response the emergence of AUKUS. The following is a detailed explanation of the results of the study:

1. Internal Strength Factor

In factor S1, Geostrategic Location. ASEAN is located at the intersection of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, making it a critical strategic location for trade, security, and geopolitics. As AUKUS strengthens its presence in the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN member states will need to work together to ensure that the balance of power is maintained and that regional security is not compromised. ASEAN's role in

promoting dialogue, cooperation, and peaceful solutions to conflicts will be essential in asserting its centrality.

In factor S2, Economic Influence as a Regional Organization. With a combined population of over 650 million people and a total GDP of around \$3 trillion, ASEAN member states form one of the largest and fastest-growing economic regions in the world. ASEAN can use its economic influence to promote its interests and values in the region and to build partnerships that support its objectives.

In factor S3, Inclusive ASEAN-Led Multilateral Mechanism. ASEAN has developed a range of multilateral mechanisms that are inclusive and open to other regional and global players. For example, the ARF brings together ASEAN member states and their dialogue partners to discuss regional security issues and promote dialogue and cooperation.

In factor S4, Regional Connectivity and Infrastructure Development. AUKUS has emphasized the importance of ASEAN's regional connectivity and infrastructure development, especially in terms of ensuring economic growth, sustainable development, and geopolitical balance in the region. ASEAN member states can strengthen their strategic position, and counterbalance the influence of external powers such as AUKUS.

In factor S5, ASEAN member states strong commitment to creating political stability and security in the Southeast Asian region through TAC. TAC is a vital tool for ASEAN member states can build mutual trust and respect. TAC can be used to counterbalance external influences, such as AUKUS, in the region. By promoting ASEAN's centrality and unity, TAC can help to ensure that external powers respect ASEAN's interests and do not undermine regional stability.

In factor S6, Firm method of diplomacy known as the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way has been instrumental in promoting regional

cooperation and stability in Southeast Asia for decades, and it becomes more important after the emergence of AUKUS. The ASEAN Way promotes consensus-building, non-interference, respect for diversity, and promoting dialogue, all of which are important for promoting regional security and stability in the region.

In factor S7, Cultural Diversity and Cooperation. Cultural cooperation and exchange can strengthen regional identity, enhance people-to-people connectivity, promote economic development, and build resilience within the region. By promoting cultural cooperation and exchange, ASEAN can strengthen its regional identity and foster a sense of community among member states.

In factor S8, Indonesia Strong Leadership. Indonesia's experience in managing complex and diverse interests be useful in addressing the challenges posed by AUKUS, which is potentially to have significant implications for regional security, geopolitical dynamics, and economic relations. Indonesia's strong leadership can help to ensure that ASEAN member states are consulted and engaged in the decision-making processes and that their concerns and interests are taken into account.

In factor S9, Indonesia proactive diplomacy. Indonesia has a long history of active engagement in regional and international affairs, and has been a key proponent of ASEAN's principles of non-alignment, neutrality, and peaceful coexistence. In the context of the emergence of AUKUS, Indonesia's proactive diplomacy can help to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among ASEAN member states, as well as between ASEAN and other regional and international actors.

In factor S10, Indonesia's Strong Commitment to ASEAN. As a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia has long been committed to promoting regional cooperation, solidarity, and stability. In responding to the emergence of AUKUS, Indonesia's strong commitment to ASEAN

can help to ensure that ASEAN member states remain united and cohesive in the face of new challenges and uncertainties.

2. Internal Weakness Factor

In factor W1, Differences in Interests and Ideologies. Differences in interests and ideologies can lead to a lack of unity among ASEAN member states, which can weaken the regional response to external challenges such as AUKUS. Without a united stance, ASEAN member states may find it difficult to negotiate with external powers or respond effectively to regional security challenges.

In factor W2, Uneven Economic & Military Development. ASEAN member states with weaker economies or militaries may also be more vulnerable to external powers. External powers may seek to exploit these vulnerabilities to pursue their own interests, which can undermine ASEAN's unity and centrality.

In factor W3, Dependence on External Powers. ASEAN's dependence on external powers can undermine its position as a central in the region. When external powers such as the US, Australia, and China take the lead in addressing regional issues, it can weaken ASEAN's influence and centrality. ASEAN's dependence on external powers can limit its ability to address regional issues. Since external powers may have their own priorities and interests, which may not align with those of ASEAN member states.

In factor W4, Limited Cooperation in Security Affairs. AUKUS, which is seen as a response to China's growing military influence in the region, highlights the need for ASEAN to work together more closely on security issues. There are multiple security-related frameworks in the region, including the ARF, the East Asia Summit, and the ADMM Plus. However, these frameworks do not always work together effectively, which can undermine the role ASEAN centrality to address security challenges.

In factor W5, Limited Institutional Capacity. ASEAN's limited institutional capacity limit its ability to implement agreements and initiatives related to regional cooperation. This make it difficult for ASEAN to effectively address regional challenges, including those related to security stability. This can make it difficult for ASEAN to compete with external powers, such as the US and China, who have significantly greater resources to devote to regional development.

In factor W6, Human Right Concerns. Human rights violations by some ASEAN member states can undermine the organization's legitimacy, particularly in the point of view of external parties like AUKUS. This can make it more difficult for ASEAN to advocate for its interests and to play a leading role in regional affairs.

In factor W7, Environmental Challenges. AUKUS, as a new strategic partnership, could potentially increase competition for natural resources in the region, such as oil, gas, and minerals. This can exacerbate environmental challenges and put pressure on ASEAN member states to exploit their natural resources, potentially leading to environmental degradation.

In factor W8, Indonesia's Domestic Political Instability. Domestic political instability can have an impact to Indonesia's ability to effectively engage with other ASEAN member states and external partners, and can undermine its credibility and effectiveness as an ASEAN leader this year. In responding to AUKUS, Indonesia's domestic political instability can make it more difficult for to articulate a clear and consistent position on key issues related to regional security and cooperation.

In factor W9, Indonesia's Limited Military Resources. In responding to the emergence of AUKUS, Indonesia's limited military resources can make it more challenging to effectively respond to potential security threats in the region. This can create vulnerabilities for ASEAN as a

whole and may limit Indonesia's ability to effectively lead ASEAN in addressing regional security challenges.

In factor W10, Indonesia's low technologies readiness. Indonesia's low technology readiness can be a weakness indicator for its ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, and may pose challenges in responding to the emergence of AUKUS and other regional and global challenges. This can limit Indonesia's ability to keep up with technological advancements in the region and beyond, and may affect its ability to effectively respond to emerging security challenges.

3. External Factors Opportunities

In factor O1, Enhancing regional security. ASEAN could seek to work with AUKUS to promote regional security and stability through dialogue and joint exercises. ASEAN can also enhance its partnership with other regional powers such as China, Japan, and India, to promote greater security cooperation and build trust.

In factor O2, strengthening defense capabilities. ASEAN could enhance its defense cooperation mechanisms, such as the ADMM+, to promote greater defense collaboration and sharing of best practices among its member states. ASEAN could also seek to engage in joint military exercises with external partners, including the US, UK, and Australia, to enhance its defense capabilities.

In factor O3, Encourage Greater Defense Cooperation. ASEAN can encourage greater defense cooperation by promoting joint military exercises and training among member states and with AUKUS member states. This can help build trust and interoperability between military forces and enhance the effectiveness of joint operations in response to security challenges.

In factor O4, Promoting economic growth. ASEAN can explore opportunities to deepen economic cooperation with AUKUS member

states, particularly in areas such as defense technology, innovation, and the cyber security. This can help boost economic growth and create new job opportunities in the region.

In factor O5, Supporting Rules-Based Order. ASEAN should ensure that any new initiatives and developments align with existing international norms and frameworks, such as the UNCLOS and the ARF. ASEAN must also continue to promote its initiatives aimed at promoting a rules-based order in the region, such as the TAC and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC). ASEAN can work to build greater support for these initiatives among its member states and external partners, including AUKUS member states.

In factor O6, Defense Industry Cooperation. ASEAN member states seek to modernize and upgrade their defense capabilities, they may look to AUKUS member states for new technologies and expertise. This could provide opportunities for ASEAN defense industries to collaborate with AUKUS member states on joint research and development projects, technology transfers, and joint production of defense equipment.

In factor O7, AUKUS as a Counterbalance of China's Hegemony. AUKUS could potentially provide an opportunity for ASEAN to counterbalance China's hegemony and assert its own interests in the region. AUKUS could encourage ASEAN member states to band together and work more closely on issues related to security and defense. By promoting greater regional cooperation and collaboration, ASEAN could potentially enhance its own influence and become a more effective counterbalance to China's hegemony.

In factor O8, Enhancing Capacity Building and Human Resources Development. Indonesia's ASEAN chairmanship in 2023 has an opportunity to take a leadership role in promoting capacity building and human resources development in the region, and for ASEAN as a whole

to benefit from Indonesia's expertise and experience in this area. By leveraging ASEAN's collective resources and expertise, and by working closely with other ASEAN member states, Indonesia can help to build a more resilient and prosperous ASEAN community.

In factor O9, Developing Firm Trade and Investment Policies. Developing firm trade and investment policies can help to mitigate the potential impact of AUKUS on regional trade and investment flows. By promoting greater economic integration and cooperation within ASEAN, the region can become less dependent on external major power states for trade and investment, and more resilient in the face of external influences.

In factor O10, Promoting Regional Resilience. By working closely with other ASEAN member states, Indonesia can help to develop a coordinated approach to regional security and stability, and promote policies that strengthen regional institutions and enhance military capabilities. Through building greater resilience within the region, ASEAN member states can become less dependent on external powers for security and more capable of addressing regional security challenges on their own.

4. External Threats Factors

In factor T1, Territorial Disputes in The South China Sea. China's territorial claims in the South China Sea overlap with those of several ASEAN member states, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. These disputes have led to confrontations and heightened tensions in the region, and the AUKUS agreement could potentially further complicate the situation.

In factor T2, US-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region. The US-China rivalry could lead to increased military presence and activity in the region, including the South China Sea, which could exacerbate existing territorial

disputes and heighten tensions. Additionally, the US-China rivalry could create pressure on ASEAN member states to take sides or align themselves with one or the other, which could potentially harm the unity and cohesion of the organization.

In factor T3, Increasing military tensions that can lead to an Arms Race. The transfer of such technology could potentially escalate tensions between China and the US and its allies, including Australia. This could lead to a regional arms race as other states in the region may feel the need to enhance their own military capabilities in response to perceived threats.

In factor T4, The potential for a security dilemma. AUKUS could lead to increased military tensions in the region, and other states in the region may feel compelled to increase their defense capabilities, which could in turn be seen as a threat by other states, leading to insecurity. This could also lead to the potential for miscalculation and escalation, which could ultimately result in conflict.

In factor T5, Undermining ASEAN Centrality. This could have several negative implications for ASEAN, including a loss of influence, reduced ability to shape regional policy, and a potential erosion of unity among member states. It could also make it more difficult for ASEAN to negotiate with external parties on issues such as territorial disputes, human rights, and environmental concerns.

In factor T6, Challenging existing security frameworks. AUKUS may potentially challenge existing security frameworks in the region, such as the ASEAN-led TAC and the ARF. AUKUS may potentially divert attention and resources away from these frameworks, and shift the focus towards a more exclusive security alliance, thereby undermining the role of ASEAN centrality and the spirit of inclusivity in regional security cooperation.

In factor T7, Straining diplomatic relations. This could lead to a deterioration of trust and cooperation between ASEAN and AUKUS member

states, and even potentially impact ASEAN's relationships with other nations in the region. Moreover, AUKUS may also exacerbate existing tensions between ASEAN member states and China, as China sees the agreement as a threat to its interests and influence in the region. This could further strain diplomatic relations and create a more challenging security environment for ASEAN.

In factor T8, Geographically, Potential to become a proxy battleground for US-China rivalry. AUKUS has raised concerns about the potential for Southeast Asia to become a proxy battleground for US-China rivalry, which could have significant implications for regional security and stability. As ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, Indonesia will have an important role to play in mitigating this threat and promoting regional peace and stability.

In factor T9, Potential for increased tension between ASEAN member states. The emergence of AUKUS has the potential to upset the regional balance of power, and this may lead to increased tension between ASEAN member states as they seek to protect their interests and ensure their security. This could manifest in various ways, including territorial disputes, economic competition, and strategic alignment with external powers.

In factor T10, Fragmentation of ASEAN. ASEAN's strength lies in its unity and collective action, but the emergence of AUKUS and other external factors could potentially create divisions among ASEAN member states, leading to fragmentation and weakening of the regional organization. This could have significant implications for regional security and stability, as well as economic integration and cooperation.

According to the weighting and rating results above, it is known that the total IFAS value is 1.382 and the total EFAS value is 1.4202. Therefore, EFAS is greater than IFAS. Then according to the calculations applied to the SWOT quadrant matrix, the IFAS and EFAS points are between the Strength and Opportunity quadrants. Therefore, the best possible strategy

for Indonesia through the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in asserting ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS is SO (Strengths - Opportunities), namely:

- 1) ASEAN is strategically located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and its archipelagic nature gives it a unique position. Hence, Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert ASEAN centrality by using its geostrategic location to enhance regional security after the emergence of AUKUS can be achieved through a combination of diplomatic efforts, regional security initiatives, economic cooperation, defense capabilities, and ASEAN-led multilateralism.
- 2) Indonesia can leverage its economic strength and diplomatic ties to encourage greater economic cooperation and investment in the region. This can lead to the development of ASEAN's economic and industrial base, including the defense industry. In addition, Indonesia can also use its own defense capabilities to strengthen regional security, such as through joint military exercises and partnerships with other ASEAN member states.
- 3) An inclusive ASEAN-led multilateral mechanism can provide a platform for ASEAN member states to discuss and address common regional security challenges, including those posed by AUKUS. Through this mechanism, Indonesia can encourage greater dialogue, cooperation, and trust-building among member states, while also ensuring that ASEAN remains at the center of regional security discussions.
- 4) Infrastructure investments can include the development of ports and airports, which can support the movement of military assets and personnel in times of need. Furthermore, digital connectivity can enhance intelligence sharing and communication between defense forces in the region. Overall, promoting regional connectivity and infrastructure development can have a positive impact on both the

economic and security aspects of ASEAN, supporting Indonesia's efforts to assert the role of ASEAN centrality in the face of the emergence of AUKUS.

- 5) By advocating for adherence to international law and norms, Indonesia can emphasize the importance of resolving disputes peacefully and in accordance with established frameworks, such as the UNCLOS. This can help to reinforce the principles of TAC, which include mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all states. In addition, by promoting a rules-based order, Indonesia can encourage all ASEAN member states and external parties such as AUKUS to work together to uphold regional stability and security.
- 6) Indonesia, as the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023, can use the ASEAN Way to facilitate defense industry cooperation among member states. This can be achieved by promoting dialogue and consultation on defense-related issues, establishing joint military exercises and training programs, and encouraging technology and knowledge sharing. By promoting such cooperation, ASEAN member states can build trust and confidence in each other's defense capabilities, which can ultimately enhance regional security.
- 7) ASEAN member states' cultural diversity can be a strength in building unity and cooperation within the region, especially in the face of external pressures such as China's rising influence and AUKUS. Indonesia, as the ASEAN chairmanship, can play a crucial role in encouraging greater engagement and cooperation between ASEAN and AUKUS member states while maintaining its neutrality and independence. This can help ASEAN assert its centrality and influence in the region, particularly in addressing shared security concerns.
- 8) Indonesia's strong leadership can be a significant strength in enhancing capacity building and human resources development as

an opportunity for ASEAN after the emergence of AUKUS. By leveraging its expertise and experience in key areas, and working collaboratively with other ASEAN member states and external partners, Indonesia can help to promote regional development and support the economic growth and well-being of the ASEAN region.

- 9) Indonesia's proactive diplomacy can help to build confidence and trust among ASEAN member states and promote regional cooperation. By leveraging its diplomatic strengths, Indonesia can work with other ASEAN member states to develop a unified response to AUKUS and other external challenges. This could involve strengthening trade and investment policies within ASEAN, developing regional supply chains, and promoting economic integration.
- 10) As a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia has been a key player in promoting regional cooperation and stability. In the face of external challenges such as AUKUS, Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN can help to foster greater solidarity among member states and promote regional resilience. This could involve working to strengthen ASEAN's institutional frameworks, such as the ARF, to better address regional security challenges.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

The data obtained have been analyzed and processed comprehensively so that it is associated with several theories and previous research can get a deep discussion. Based on the discussion of the results of the research conducted, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- a. AUKUS is a crucial issue for ASEAN, considering that ASEAN has the principle of centrality, where ASEAN is a key player in decision-making and the future of the region. The emergence of AUKUS will bring ASEAN into a security dilemma where the procurement of nuclear submarines for Australia will bring about a new chapter in the arms race in the region. The emergence of AUKUS will trigger an arms race in the region. From the theory used by the researcher and the results of the interviews above, it can be explained that Indonesia's perspective as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 in responding to the emergence of AUKUS, including:
 1. AUKUS is a cause of concern for Indonesia and other ASEAN member states due to its potential impact on the region's military power balance and the possible violation of treaties and regulations.
 2. Indonesia, as Chairmanship of ASEAN 2023, is committed to building a stronger and united ASEAN that can protect the region from external influences and maintain its centrality.
 3. AUKUS is a response to China's increasing military and economic influence in Southeast Asia, and it can serve as a counterbalance to China's assertiveness in the South China Sea.

4. Indonesia's approach towards AUKUS is cautious, and it aims to maintain transparency and good communication to prevent potential conflicts and promote regional security and peace.
 5. Indonesia is taking proactive measures to promote regional stability and security, including proposing to downgrade the AOIP concept and emphasizing responsible use of nuclear-powered submarines by Australia.
 6. ASEAN member states have differing views on the US-China rivalry, which can weaken ASEAN's centrality and bargaining power, and Indonesia must ensure ASEAN remains united.
 7. Indonesia must emphasize ASEAN centrality to achieve a strong regional security defense that supports economic progress, and it can use the AOIP to promote a cooperative approach to regional security based on openness, transparency, inclusivity, and respect for international law.
- b. The strategy used by Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert ASEAN centrality after the emergence of AUKUS through SWOT analysis, it is found that the relevant strategy is the use of the SO (Strength -Opportunity) strategy, which is to mobilize and utilize the strengths possessed to take advantage of the maximum opportunities. Hence, the best strategy is based on SO (Strengths-Opportunities), namely:
1. Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 to assert ASEAN centrality by using its geostrategic location to enhance regional security after the emergence of AUKUS can be achieved through a combination of diplomatic efforts, regional security initiatives, economic cooperation, defense capabilities, and ASEAN-led multilateralism.
 2. Indonesia can leverage its economic strength and diplomatic ties to encourage greater economic cooperation and investment in the region.

3. An inclusive ASEAN-led multilateral mechanism can provide a platform for ASEAN member states to discuss and address common regional security challenges, including those posed by AUKUS.
4. Infrastructure investments can include the development of ports and airports, which can support the movement of military assets and personnel in times of need. Furthermore, digital connectivity can enhance intelligence sharing and communication between defense forces in the region.
5. By advocating for adherence to international law and norms, Indonesia can emphasize the importance of resolving disputes peacefully and in accordance with established frameworks, such as the UNCLOS.
6. Indonesia, as the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023, can use the ASEAN Way to facilitate defense industry cooperation among member states.
7. ASEAN member states' cultural diversity can be a strength in building unity and cooperation within the region, especially in the face of external pressures such as China's rising influence and AUKUS.
8. As ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, Indonesia can take a proactive role in promoting regional capacity building and human resources development since AUKUS have potential can provide access to expertise, technology, and funding, which can help to support regional development initiatives and advance the economic and defense development of ASEAN member states.
9. Indonesia can help to promote regional cooperation and stability, and build a more resilient and prosperous ASEAN community by working closely with other ASEAN member states and leveraging its proactive diplomatic strengths.

10. Indonesia's strong commitment to ASEAN is an important strength in promoting regional resilience and can help ASEAN to navigate external challenges such as AUKUS. Through Indonesia's chairmanship, ASEAN member states can work together to promote economic growth and reduce dependence on external actors.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the results of this study, the researcher provides suggestions that can be used as input and considerations in compiling and implementing strategies and policies to realize national interests, as well as triggers in the development of Defense Science studies, especially Defense Diplomacy:

1. Before reaching out to ASEAN's external partners, Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 must increase dialogue within ASEAN. We can see that within ASEAN there are still various opinions among ASEAN member states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia which have different views from Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines in addressing the emergence of AUKUS. Furthermore, dialogue can also be enhanced by presenting AUKUS as an external partner of ASEAN. In this dialogue, the possibilities that could occur in the cooperation between Australia, Britain, and the United States could be discussed which could affect the security of the ASEAN region. This dialogue is expected to produce cooperative security that is beneficial to both parties as well as help ASEAN to emphasize its centrality and unity in maintaining regional security stability.
2. Dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN's external partners should be enhanced to achieve mutual benefits and interests. Indonesia as the chairmanship of ASEAN 2023 and geopolitically and geostrategically the most recognized state among ASEAN member states, has an important role in maintaining security stability in the region. Responding to the emergence of AUKUS which triggers tension

between AUKUS and China, which could lead to military conflict and nuclear war, Indonesia and ASEAN need to play a significant role in several ways, including (1) building ASEAN's collective stance by continuing to prioritize a neutral stance, (2) building strategic trust with defense diplomacy for confidence-building measures in the region in peaceful ways through dialogue and cooperation involving all relevant parties (AUKUS, ASEAN, China); and (3) asserting the principles contained in the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP), namely ASEAN Centrality and Unity.

3. Comprehensive follow-up research is needed regarding the centrality of ASEAN in the region after the emergence of AUKUS and what is the most ideal policy for ASEAN in responding to AUKUS so that ASEAN as a regional organization in the region is not marginalized as a form of perfecting this research. So that other research will help emphasize the centrality of ASEAN through building mutual trust, especially involving states that are members of AUKUS together with China and other states to build mutual trust through the mechanism of defense diplomacy for CBM which has been initiated by ASEAN to maintain stability security in the region.

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APPENDIX 1

THESIS INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

Interview Guidelines

Name	: Alma Evelinda Silalahi
Student ID	: 120210103002
Study Program	: Defense Diplomacy
Faculty	: Defense Strategy
Thesis Proposal Title	: ASEAN CENTRALITY AFTER THE EMERGENCE OF AUKUS

Overview


Sentralitas telah menjadi mantra bagi ASEAN selama bertahun-tahun. Hal ini termaktub dalam Piagam ASEAN yang diadopsi pada tahun 2007. Selain dinamika internal, sentralitas ASEAN semakin ditantang dengan mengintensifkan keterlibatan geopolitik negara-negara besar di kawasan termasuk Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad, melibatkan AS, Jepang, Australia, dan India) dan AUKUS. Sentralitas ASEAN sangat penting untuk menegakkan hukum internasional dan membangun arsitektur regional yang terbuka, inklusif, dan berbasis aturan. Sentralitas ASEAN juga penting bagi mereka yang berada di luar Asia Tenggara, untuk mengelola potensi konflik antara negara-negara kekuatan besar seperti Amerika Serikat dan Tiongkok, dan dalam membangun arsitektur keamanan untuk kawasan Indo-Pasifik lainnya. Kondisi ini menuntut anggota ASEAN untuk membentuk unified voice. Dengan suara yang bersatu, ASEAN harus mencegah divergensi internal yang mengakibatkan ketidakseimbangan kebijakan. Adalah kepentingan setiap negara anggota ASEAN bahwa ASEAN menjadi lebih sentral daripada AS dalam pendekatan ke kawasan. Namun, pengumuman AUKUS dan Quad

menunjukkan bahwa ASEAN mungkin dikesampingkan oleh negara-negara besar.

Daftar Pertanyaan:

1. Akhir tahun 2021 lalu kawasan Indo-Pasifik dikejutkan dengan dibentuknya pakta pertahanan antara Amerika, Inggris dan Australia dengan nama AUKUS. Pakta pertahanan tersebut memulai langkah awalnya dengan menyediakan setidaknya 8 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir untuk Australia. Dengan adanya AUKUS ini dampak apa yang mungkin terjadi di Kawasan Indo-Pasifik lebih khusus lagi bagaimana dampak AUKUS terhadap sentralitas ASEAN di Indo-Pasifik dalam situasi geopolitik yang sangat fluktuatif, tidak pasti, dan selalu berubah saat ini?
2. Indonesia sebagai ketua ASEAN 2023 dengan adanya AUKUS akan menghadapi tantangan dikeranakan negara anggota ASEAN memberikan respon yang bervariasi terhadap kemunculan AUKUS, peran atau langkah seperti apa yang harus diambil Indonesia untuk ASEAN dalam merespon AUKUS?
3. Beberapa opini dari media internasional banyak yang menyebutkan bahwa AUKUS dibentuk untuk melawan hegemoni China yang semakin meningkat di kawasan Indo-Pasifik, apakah bapak/ibu setuju dengan opini tersebut?
4. Dengan dibentuknya AUKUS, Australia yang secara geografis letaknya dekat dengan Indonesia dan negara anggota ASEAN akan menjadi negara ke tujuh yang memiliki kapal selam bertenaga nuklir. Mempertimbangkan letak geografis akan ada kemungkinan bahwa kapal selam tersebut akan berpatroli melewati wilayah laut teritorial Indonesia maupun negara ASEAN lainnya dan melanggar Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, bagaimana strategi/respon diplomasi ASEAN yang sebaiknya dilakukan?

Gambar 1: Kemungkinan Area Operasi untuk Kapal Selam Australia/Jalur Upaya Strategis Utama Australia



5. Tantangan terhadap sentralitas ASEAN di Indo-Pasifik semakin nyata ketika terbentuk aliansi militer AUKUS. Meskipun telah meminta agar pihak eksternal menghormati sentralitas ASEAN, namun belum ada langkah nyata yang bisa dilakukan oleh ASEAN dalam menghadapi AUKUS, Tiongkok dan kekuatan besar lainnya di Indo-Pasifik. Persaingan Amerika Serikat dan Tiongkok di Indo-Pasifik sangat berpotensi mengancam ASEAN menjadi kelompok marginal di kawasannya sendiri. Pada tahun 2023 Indonesia kembali menjadi Ketua ASEAN untuk keempat kalinya, inisiatif seperti apa yang sebaiknya Indonesia lakukan untuk menegaskan kembali sentralitas ASEAN?
6. Kemunculan AUKUS menempatkan ASEAN dalam dilema dikarenakan negara-negara anggota ASEAN tidak satu suara dalam merespon adanya AUKUS. Dengan sikap berbeda yang ditunjukkan oleh negara anggota, maka tidak dapat dipungkiri sentralitas ASEAN sebagai organisasi semakin dipersoalkan. Upaya diplomasi pertahanan seperti apa yang harus dilakukan untuk membangun dan meningkatkan kembali rasa kesatuan dan kepercayaan antar negara

anggota ASEAN sehingga sentralitas ASEAN dapat semakin ditegaskan?

7. Upaya diplomasi pertahanan seperti apa yang paling ideal dilakukan oleh ASEAN sebagai organisasi dalam mencegah potensi konflik yang disebabkan oleh AUKUS karena diindikasikan akan terjadi eskalasi sengketa Laut China Selatan dan meningkatnya potensi perlombaan senjata di Indo-Pasifik, sehingga berdampak khususnya pada negara-negara anggota ASEAN yang secara geografis berada di pusaran konflik?

APPENDIX 2

APPLICATION LETTER FOR PERMIT FOR RESEARCH AND DATA
COLLECTION



KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN RI
UNIVERSITAS PERTAHANAN RI
Terakreditasi BAN-PT "A"

Nomor : BI 3924 /XII/2022
 Klasifikasi : Biasa
 Lampiran : -
 Hal : Permohonan Surat Izin dan Rekomendasi Pelaksanaan Penelitian.

Jakarta, 28 November 2022

Kepada
 Yth. Direktur Kebijakan Strategis
 Pertahanan, Ditjen Strahan,
 Kemhan
 di
 Jakarta

1. Dasar:

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- b. Keputusan Rektor Universitas Pertahanan RI Nomor: KEP/298/XII/2021 tanggal 31 Desember 2021 tentang Program Kerja dan Anggaran Universitas Pertahanan RI TA. 2022.
- c. Kalender Akademik Program Studi Diplomasia Pertahanan Fakultas Strategi Pertahanan Universitas Pertahanan Republik Indonesia Tahun Akademik 2021/2022.

2. Sehubungan dasar di atas, dengan hormat disampaikan bahwa Mahasiswa Program Studi Diplomasia Pertahanan Fakultas Strategi Pertahanan Unhan RI atas nama Alma Evelinda Silalahi dengan NIM 120210103002, bermaksud untuk melakukan penelitian dengan judul "*Renewing Asean Centrality After The Emergence Of Aukus Through Defense Diplomacy For Security Stability In The Indo-Pacific Region*".

3. Berkenaan dengan hal tersebut mohon diizinkan mahasiswa yang dimaksud untuk melaksanakan penelitian dalam rangka mendapatkan data dan keterangan termasuk melakukan wawancara dengan pejabat yang ditunjuk. Mohon konfirmasi waktu, tempat pelaksanaan wawancara dan pemberian kuesioner, nomor HP: +62 813-3967-1520 dan email: almasilalahi99@gmail.com

4. Demikian mohon menjadi periksa.

a.n. Rektor
 Universitas Pertahanan
 Republik Indonesia
 Dekan Fakultas Strategi Pertahanan,



[Signature]
 Dr. Prayanto, S.I.P., M.Si. (Han).
 Mayor Jenderal TNI

Tembusan:

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2. Warek I, Warek II, dan Warek III Unhan RI
3. Ka. LPPM Unhan RI
4. Karo AK dan Karorenku Unhan RI.

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 Klasifikasi : Biasa
 Lampiran : -
 Hal : Permohonan Surat Izin dan
 Rekomendasi Pelaksanaan
 Penelitian.

Jakarta, 28 November 2022

Kepada
 Yth. Direktur Kerja Sama Internasional
 Pertahanan, Ditjen Strahan
 Kemhan
 di
 Jakarta

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a.n. Rektor
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Anto, S., F., M.Si.(Han).
 Mayor Jenderal TNI

Tembusan:

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Nomor : BI/ 3924 /XII/2022

Jakarta, 28 November 2022

Klasifikasi : Biasa

Lampiran : -

Hal : Permohonan Surat Izin dan
 Rekomendasi Pelaksanaan
 Penelitian.

Kepada

Yth. Direktur Kerjasama Politik dan
 Keamanan ASEAN, Kemlu RI
 di

Jakarta

1. Dasar:

- a. Peraturan Presiden Nomor 5 Tahun 2011 tentang Universitas Pertahanan sebagai Perguruan Tinggi yang diselenggarakan oleh Pemerintah.
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 Republik Indonesia
 Dekan Fakultas Strategi Pertahanan,



Dr. Priyanto, S.I.P., M.Si.(Han).
 Mayor Jenderal TNI

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 Telepon +6221-87951555/87954555, Website: www.idu.ac.id

APPENDIX 3

RESEARCH DOCUMENTATION

1st Interview

Informant : Colonel Imam S. Cahyono, S.S., M.Sc
Informant Profile : Middle Policy Analyst for CB, CBM & Preventive
Diplomacy of Directorate of International Cooperation,
Ministry of Defense of The Republic of Indonesia
Date : 8 February 2023
Location : Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, Jl.
Medan Merdeka Barat



2nd Interview

Informant : Marine Colonel DR. Steven T. Sambouw,
S.H., S.KEP., M.H., M.AP.

Informant Profile : Head of the Sub-Directorate of National Defense
Policy Formulation and Implementation of
Directorate of Defense Strategy Policy, Ministry of
Defense of The Republic of Indonesia

Date : 7 February 2023

Location : Online via WhatsApp Video Call



3rd Interview

Informant : Rolliansyah Soemirat
Informant Profile : Director of ASEAN Political and Security
Cooperation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Indonesia
Date : 9 February 2023
Location : Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Jakarta

